Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-93-213
Friday
5 November 1993

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FBIS-EEU-93-213 *5 November 1993*

CONTENTS

NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.
An Ω indicates a Foreign Media Note.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Owen Warns of Deterioration of Balkan Crisis *[AFP]* 1
Slovak President Addresses NATO Council *[Bratislava Radio]* 1

INTER-EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Czech, Slovak Foreign Ministers Meet in Strasbourg *[CTK]* 2
Hungary's Jeszenszky Discusses Romania, NACC *[Bucharest Radio]* 2

BULGARIA

Zhelev Reportedly Tells Berov To Resign *[BTA]* 3
President's Office Denies Report *[BTA]* 3
Matinchev Says Government Will Not Resign *[BTA]* 3
Officials Seize Romanian Ship Violating Sanctions *[BTA]* 3
'Sources' Claim Neev Tried To Breach UN Embargo *[TRUD 29 Oct]* 4
Cabinet Amends Trade Regulations for Gas Weapons *[BTA]* 4
BSP Leader Videnov on Meeting With U.S. Envoy *[BTA]* 4
Russian Envoy Views Problems of Debt Settlements *[BTA]* 5
Ukraine Envoy: Economic Relations 'Show Some Progress' *[BTA]* 5

CZECH REPUBLIC

Klaus Interviewed on Balladur Plan, Security *[Paris LE MONDE 3 Nov]* 6
Zieleniec Comments on Possible NATO Membership *[CTK]* 7
Parties 'Satisfied' With Foreign Policy Talks *[CTK]* 7
More Troops Leave for Former Yugoslavia *[CTK]* 7
Journalists Criticize Latest Police Directive *[CTK]* 8
Military Service for Private Farmers Reduced *[CTK]* 8

SLOVAKIA

Meciar Comments on Process of Forming Government *[CTK]* 9
Moravcik on Bilateral Agreements on Ethnic Rights *[CTK]* 9

HUNGARY

Antall Expected To Return by 'Early Next Week' *[MTI]* 10
Russian Science Minister on Possible Cooperation *[NEPSZABADSAG 29 Oct]* 10
Fodor Quits FIDESZ, Resigns Parliamentary Mandate *[MTI]* 10
Basic Treaties With Croatia, Slovenia Ratified *[MTI]* 11

POLAND

Kwasniewski Discusses Coalition Options *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 29 Oct]* 12
Pawlak Government's Stand on Debt Unchanged *[PAP]* 13
Oleksy Urges IMF 'Flexibility' on Budget *[PAP]* 13
PC Reportedly Closer to Coalition With ZChN *[PAP]* 13

ROMANIA

Iliescu Calls For Interethnic, Economic 'Dialogue' *[ROMPRES]* 14
Financial Officials Debate Monetary Policy *[ROMPRES]* 14
New Civic Alliance Party Program Reviewed *[TINERETUL LIBER 27 Oct]* 14

BALKAN CRISIS ROUNDUP

Foreign Media Bulletin: Balkan Crisis 5 November 16

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Izetbegovic Comments on Changes in Army *[Sarajevo Radio]* 17
Vares Croats Appeal to Serbs for Help *[TANJUG]* 21
UN Officer Likens Army to 'Band of Thieves' *[AFP]* 22
Looting Reported in Vares *[AFP]* 22
UN Troops Return Fire After Sarajevo Attack *[AFP]* 22
Bihac Officials Protest UNPROFOR Actions *[Sarajevo Radio]* 23
Further on Protest, Reaction *[AFP]* 23
Abdic, Izetbegovic Forces Clash in Northwest *[TANJUG]* 24
Heavy Muslim-Croat Fighting Near Zepce Reported *[Zagreb Radio]* 24

CROATIA

Sarinic Comments on Oslo Meeting With Serbs *[Zagreb TV]* 25
RSK Plans to Indict Tudjman for 'War Crimes' *[TANJUG]* 26
Serbs Reportedly Attack Coastal Towns *[Zagreb Radio]* 26
Appeal Issued for Aid in Accommodating Refugees *[Zagreb Radio]* 26
Commentary Condemns HVO Role in Massacre *[VJESNIK 29 Oct]* 27

YUGOSLAVIA

Serbia

Milosevic Orders Arrests of SRS Members *[AFP]* 28
Milosevic Addresses Current Issues *[Belgrade TV]* 28
Elections To Be Open to Foreign Observers *[TANJUG]* 42

Kosovo

Serbs Refuse Rugova Passport, French Trip Canceled *[Tirana Radio]* 42

Owen Warns of Deterioration of Balkan Crisis

AU0411203393 Paris AFP in English 2026 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Excerpts] Geneva, Nov 4 (AFP)—The risk of a new Serbo-Croatian war and an intensification of the conflict in Bosnia has increased following the breakdown of talks on the contested Krajina region of Croatia, EC mediator David Owen said on Thursday [4 November].

"The political leaders, supported by the military leaders of all three sides, have made the decision to continue to fight each other," Owen said during a press conference here.

He put part of the blame for the failed talks between the Croatian Government and leaders of the breakaway Serbian region of Krajina—which broke down after three days in Oslo on Wednesday—on Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, who announced his own "peace initiative" during the Oslo talks.

"Its timing was unfortunate in relationship with the talks in Norway," Owen said. "I do not really see why they (the propositions) were produced at the time they were produced."

Owen, who was in Geneva to meet with officials in charge of humanitarian aid in ex-Yugoslavia, stressed the difficulty of carrying out relief operations "in the middle of a battlefield."

"It is perfectly obvious that they are all interfering with supplies and interfering with all important power—whether electricity, coal, gas or oil—for strategic military purposes," he said.

No initiatives other than a peaceful settlement to the conflict will solve the problem, he added. "If any of us has any illusion about this, we are heading for a very nasty humanitarian disaster this winter." [passage omitted]

Norwegian ambassador Knut Vollebaek, [Conference on Yugoslavia Cochairman] Stoltenberg's assistant, said on Thursday that a French and a German diplomat had also participated in the Oslo talks as a "symbolic initiative of two enemies in Europe having become friends."

"This cannot be seen as a local, small conflict," he said. "France and Germany have taken steps for the negotiations and they foresee a possibly more active role" in resolving the conflict.

Slovak President Addresses NATO Council

LD0411221293 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Excerpt] Slovak President Michal Kovac left for a two-day visit to Belgium yesterday. Let us recall that the capital, Brussels, is the seat of the most significant military, security, and economic structures of the Western world. Today's address by Michal Kovac to the ambassadors of NATO member states and the Council of the Western European Union [WEU] should send a clear signal about Slovakia's interest in joining NATO. Ludmila Bulakova telephoned this report on the visit:

[Bulakova] The culmination of not only today, but also the entire two-day stay of President Michal Kovac in the Kingdom of Belgium is his address at the seat of NATO which he is delivering to the members of the Council at this moment. The president ascribes dual significance both to the visit and to the possibility of taking the floor in NATO: first, it is an expression of our unequivocal interest in cooperation with NATO with prospective aspirations for membership, and second it is also a sign that NATO is seriously considering our aspirations.

As to the doubts about our orientation, Michal Kovac said that the Slovak Republic has chosen its path not only because it was obliged to do so by the previous pledges inherited from the former federation, but also because it is seeking its place side by side with the West, fully identifying with its fundamental cultural and political values.

In connection with the complicated process of the systematic economic transformation of Slovakia, the president expressed the conviction that it will result in full membership in the European Union, but at the same time he said that European integration requires sufficient security guarantees. Inasmuch as at the moment we cannot expect them to spread to Slovakia, he expressed the view that the alternative could be associate membership in NATO and the WEU. This would not require full integration of military components and even this type of membership need not include the guarantees stated in Article 5 of the Washington treaty on setting up the alliance or Article 5 of the modified Brussels treaty which guarantees to regular members of the alliance automatic military help in the event of aggression.

As to security however, Slovakia's membership of the Visegrad Four should also be accepted, which, as Michal Kovac stressed, should be best assessed as a certain geographic, strategic, but also economic entity. In his view, however, closer ties between our countries and NATO and the WEU would not mean a threat to Russia and Ukraine, but on the contrary, he thinks that NATO and the WEU will find suitable form of cooperation with them which will contribute towards security in the world.

Concluding his address, President Michal Kovac assured members of NATO Council that the often sensitively perceived Slovak-Hungarian relations, in his profound conviction, will not become a destabilizing element in central Europe. [passage omitted]

Czech, Slovak Foreign Ministers Meet in Strasbourg

LD0511032493 Prague CTK in English 2339 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] Strasbourg, Nov 4 (CTK)—Czech and Slovak Foreign Ministers Josef Zieleniec and Jozef Moravcik met after the session of the committee of ministers of Council of Europe today to discuss Czech-Slovak relations.

Their talks focused on Czech-Slovak border crossings, harmonisation of the consular fees for citizens of the two states and candidacy for a post in the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), Zieleniec said. Zieleniec said that he had turned to his counterpart with the request to intercede on the Czech Republic's behalf with the relevant Slovak institutions.

Zieleniec also said that he had asked Moravcik about the composition of the new coalition Slovak cabinet. Moravcik answered that the creation of the coalition government would not mean any change in the programme declaration of the government, as it was just a cabinet reshaping.

The talks about the cabinet composition have been conducted since the coalition agreement between the HZDS (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia) and the SNS (Slovak National Party) was concluded on October 19.

Well-informed sources said earlier that Moravcik was to be dismissed from his post. The issue of the appointment of the new ministers is to be resolved in a few days, Moravcik said without further specification.

Hungary's Jeszenszky Discusses Romania, NACC

AU0411214593 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 2000 GMT 4 Nov 93

["Exclusive" interview with Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky by Doina Saiciuc in Strasbourg on 4 November; recorded, in English with superimposed translation into Romanian, translated from the Romanian]

[Text] [Saiciuc] Minister Geza Jeszenszky, do you believe that relations between Romania and Hungary will improve now that both our countries are partners within the Council of Europe?

[Jeszenszky] Of course, being members of the same institution presents us with yet another opportunity for bilateral talks, although I cannot say that I did not have enough opportunities to conduct discussions with my Romanian colleagues in the past. However, once the Council of Europe has decided to accept Romania in the hope that your country will thus make progress along the road to building a fully democratic society and that this process will be accelerated, Hungary, as member of the Council of Europe, obviously welcomes Romania's admittance. We will strive to make use of this new opportunity and I believe that the principles promoted by the Council of Europe and the atmosphere within it—for instance, several statements were made this morning in this respect—will be useful for Romania, too. As far as the Council of Europe is concerned, it is obvious that Council representatives hope that there are many issues on which Romania, I believe, will be able to make significant headway. Therefore, I believe that the status of being a member can be truly useful for helping along the progress of Romania's democratization.

[Saiciuc] Has any progress been made in the sphere of bilateral relations in the wake of your recent visit to Romania?

[Jeszenszky] I certainly recall my visit with great pleasure. I had the feeling, which was further reinforced by press reviews received through the kindness of [Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor] Melescanu, that we did not just sign certain accords or reach some understandings on the opening of new border crossing points. I also had a much better opportunity to present Hungary's situation, from my viewpoint, to the Romanian press and public. I believe that this alone was an important achievement and I am very pleased to be able to talk to you now.

[Saiciuc] In another order of ideas, how would you characterize overall relations within the North Atlantic Cooperation Council [NACC] among the NATO partners on this body?

[Jeszenszky] The NACC is a very loose organization, which has proved quite useful at times. For instance, the success of the latest NACC meeting, which took place in Athens, was not so much due to the official meeting per se, but to the fact that it was followed by a trip on the Aegean Sea, which allowed us all to have all kinds of shorter or longer talks. I had a very interesting and frank conversation with Mr. Melescanu. I believe that that meeting was yet another element that contributed to turning my visit to Romania into a useful and successful one. Therefore, I believe that the NACC is a framework within which the countries that have had to suffer so much because of communism can make our Western partners more aware of our problems and our security concerns. Of course, all such forums are useful, but the important thing is not to limit ourselves to mere statements, but to be able to take decisions and ensure that the pledges made are followed through by actual facts. Therefore, the NACC's success will depend on how much success it has in its efforts to contribute to creating better conditions of security and stability in Europe.

[Saiciuc] Do you expect Hungary to become a member of an enlarged NATO?

[Jeszenszky] As a historian I believe I know something about the past, but I am certainly not a prophet. Realistically speaking, I do not think that obtaining the status of full member of the NATO organization is on the agenda of its summit. However, this subject will eventually have to be addressed and I hope we will be able to find ways and means to facilitate a gradual expansion of NATO toward the east, while also proving ourselves capable of establishing a beneficial partnership with Russia.

Zhelev Reportedly Tells Berov To Resign

AU0411201193 Sofia BTA in English 1025 GMT 4 Nov 93

[From BTA's 4 November press review]

[Text] Sofia, November 4 (BTA) - OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK leads on a report that in a Monday [1 November] tete-a-tete with Prime Minister Berov, President Zhelev allegedly informed him that he should immediately submit his resignation, preferably together with the 1994 draft budget. The new cabinet was reportedly composed and approved by Dr. Zhelev, the newspaper writes, quoting sources close to the office of the president. According to the sources, this would be a coalition government on the mandate of the Bulgarian Socialist Party, the largest parliamentary force at present which, under the Constitution, has the right to form a government after the fall of the incumbent cabinet. The formula of the new government, headed by Mr. Dimitur Ludzhev MP of the New Union for Democracy (a parliamentary faction bringing together defectors and expellees from the Union of Democratic Forces - SDS) was allegedly resorted to in an effort to avoid a caretaker government and to prolong the life of parliament as much as possible, writes OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK. Parliament has yet to consider an electoral law, the powers of a caretaker cabinet and whether local elections should precede parliamentary elections, comments KONTINENT, adding that to keep themselves busy, the MP's will practise, among other things, at a mandate of yet another government within the life of this parliament. Mr. Ivan Kostov MP, deputy floor leader of the SDS, says the cabinet survives thanks to a universal fear of things getting worse and a universal fear of assuming responsibility for subsequent political actions, writes DEMOKRATSIYA, quoting Mr. Kostov's statement on National Radio yesterday. Dr. Konstantin Trenchev, leader of the Podkrepa Labor Confederation, expects public upheaval before new year if there are no cabinet changes, writes the labour amalgamation's daily PODKREPA. "KNSB, the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria, This Country's Other Major Labour Amalgamation Sets Conditions For Cabinet Support" is the headline of a story in PARI, covering a memorandum from the confederation to the president, the government and the parliamentary parties. The leaders of the extraparliamentary Bulgarian Social Democratic Party found that the government is already "running out of steam," the Social Democrats' weekly SVOBODEN NAROD writes.

President's Office Denies Report

AU0411212593 Sofia BTA in English 2029 GMT 4 Nov 93

["Today"—BTA lead]

[Excerpt] Sofia, November 4 (BTA)—The President's Press Office today denied an article frontpaged by the independent OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK, headlined "Zhelev, BSP Ready With Coalition Cabinet." The paper said that meeting privately with Prime Minister Lyuben Berov on Monday, President Zhelyu Zhelev asked him to immediately tender his resignation. President Zhelev has prepared and approved a coalition cabinet to be formed on the mandate of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP, the largest force in parliament which has the right to form a cabinet after a downfall of the present one) and led by Dimitur Ludzhev MP of the fourth parliamentary force New Union for Democracy (NSD), OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK quoted sources close to the President's Office as saying. The Presidential Press Office called the report "a pack of amazing lies." Every cabinet is elected or forced out of office by parliament, says the press office statement. [passage omitted]

Matinchev Says Government Will Not Resign

AU0411202893 Sofia BTA in English 1756 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] Sofia, November 4 (BTA)—The cabinet will neither resign nor ask parliament for a confidence vote, Evgeni Matinchev, deputy prime minister and minister of labour and social affairs, said at a briefing at the Council of Ministers today. The cabinet is carrying out its programme under extremely difficult circumstances, Mr. Matinchev said. According to him, the Yugo-embargo and the worst drought in 104 years had an adverse effect on the economic performance this year. There is a lot of talk about early elections and a possible fall of the cabinet, but it will have no impact on the cabinet's work, he said.

Answering questions about national security, Mr. Matinchev, who is also chairman of the Interagency Council for the Defence Industry, said the cabinet insists that a national military doctrine be worked out as soon as possible. Mr. Matinchev said the military doctrine would determine the tasks of the military-industrial complex. The doctrine should be discussed by the Parliamentary National Security Committee and should probably be proposed by the Office of the President, Mr. Matinchev said.

Officials Seize Romanian Ship Violating Sanctions

AU0411200993 Sofia BTA in English 1152 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] Vidin, November 4 (BTA)—The representatives of the Western European Union and the Sanctions Assistance Mission, customs officers from Vidin and officials of the state Shipping Inspectorate have arrested the Romanian vessel Giurgiu-3, Mr. Vladimir Zubarev, chief of the State Shipping Inspectorate in Vidin, told BTA.

The Romanian boat carries about 5,000 tons of fuel in four barges. The cargo, documented as gas oil for household uses, is destined to the Serbian port of Smederevo.

The boat has a permit issued by the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee for three of the barged that carry 4,000 tons of the embargoed commodity. There is fuel in the fourth barge as well, claimed to be internally transported from one Romanian port to another, however, there is no permit for it.

As the controlling authorities had doubts about the type of transported fuel, the boat was arrested and laboratory tests of its cargo were made.

Some days ago the Western [European] Union representatives had a similar case: The Romanian vessel Giurgiu-18 discharged the fuel it carried at a Serbian port. Legal proceedings were intialled against the embargo-busters in Romania.

Giurgiu-3 will be under arrest at Vidin until the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee comes forward with a final decision on the case.

'Sources' Claim Neev Tried To Breach UN Embargo

AU0411211993 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 29 Oct 93 pp 1, 2

[Report by Ayrin Todorova: "N. Neev Allegedly Sent Tanker Train to Serbia"]

[Text] TRUD has learned from reliable sources that last Wednesday night [27 October], former Deputy Prime Minister Neycho Neev and the head of a well-known transport company tried to send an entire tanker freight train loaded with petroleum products through the Kalotina border checkpoint with Serbia.

The two men evidently did not operate by the tried and tested telephone method, but were clearly spotted on our western border. However, our seasoned customs officers did not close their eyes to this gross infringement of the Yugoslav embargo, and refused to let the tankers through.

In all likelihood, the tankers were loaded with Bulgarian petroleum products. It is not yet known how many tonnes of fuel were to be sent to former Yugoslavia, but the case is under investigation. We are also waiting for the state officials responsible to provide explanations.

It remains a riddle in what capacity Neycho Neev tried to commit such an audacious act. Was he acting as the former deputy prime minister and minister of transport, or as a National Assembly deputy who has still to find his place in any parliamentary group?

The suspicion is aroused that, after failing to carry out deals with embargoed goods during his time as deputy prime minister, Neycho Neev is perhaps now making money from his accumulated contacts through private business. Incidentally, he has not yet cleared out his office in the Council of Ministers building.

Informed observers wonder whether this shady deal was discussed and worked out during that notorious meeting at the Crimea Restaurant in Sofia on 26 August, when Deputy Prime Minister Neev met state and government leaders from Serbia and Montenegro as private individuals, keeping it secret from the government. The observers fear that Neev's latest oil products initiative may cause international difficulties for Bulgaria.

Cabinet Amends Trade Regulations for Gas Weapons

AU0411202793 Sofia BTA in English 1726 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] Sofia, November 4 (BTA)—The Council of Ministers today changed import and export regulations for gas weapons. It passed a decree, sponsored by Trade Minister Valentin Karabashev, saying licences for trade in gas weapons will be issued by the Ministry of Trade after coordination with the Ministry of the Interior. Trade in gas arms has so far been supervised by the Governmental Commission Controlling Trade in Military and Special-Purpose Goods.

Within a hail management programme sponsored by Agriculture Minister Georgi Tanev, the Council of Ministers approved a decree renewing special extrabudgetary and budgetary financing for the Hail Management Directorate.

The cabinet approved and will move to parliament to ratify two lending agreements sponsored by Finance Minister Stoyan Aleksandrov. One is a 17-year $55 million agreement with the World Bank on partial investment and export financing, signed in Washington on September 30. The loan is aimed to promote the private sector and a stable and efficient banking system, says the sponsor.

The cabinet also approved a $100 million lending agreement with the Japanese Export/Import Bank signed in Tokyo this July to co-finance the structural adjustment loan granted by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

The Council of Ministers approved a draft accord on reciprocal investment protection and promotion with Australia. It entrusted Finance Minister Stoyan Aleksandrov to carry on negotiations and sign the accord.

The cabinet gave permission to the Russian ship Mius to call at the Varna port from November 9 to 12 to deliver food and replacements of the personnel of Russian ships being repaired in Bulgaria.

BSP Leader Videnov on Meeting With U.S. Envoy

AU0411192493 Sofia BTA in English 1714 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] Sofia, November 4 (BTA)—Mr. Zhan Videnov, leader of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), today met

with U.S. Ambassador William Montgomery. After the meeting Mr. Videnov told the press the discussion had focused on the economic and social problems Bulgaria would face in 1994, when "the most difficult stage of the crisis will be compounded by the most painful reforms." "Mr. Montgomery highly praised our readiness to work for a consensus on the economic reforms," the socialist leader said. Today's meeting is the first of a series of talks on issues central to Bulgaria and bilateral relations, according to Mr. Videnov. The BSP leadership will meet Mr. Montgomery again later this month. According to Mr. Videnov, the Socialist Party will have worked out by then its position on the continuation of reforms, more active foreign debt talks, and foreign financing.

Constitutional provisions for the formation of parties based on ethnicity and religion may destabilize the country, Mr. Videnov said at the meeting. He told the press that "the interest shown in this issue is not a campaign aimed at fanning anti-American attitudes or ethnic intolerance but a very serious problem on which Bulgarian society demands a clear-cut, categorical position." Representatives of the BSP criticized Mr. Montgomery even before his arrival here for his statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee concerning that part of the Bulgarian Constitution banning parties run on ethnic lines.

Today's meeting with Mr. Videnov was Mr. Montgomery's third meeting with leaders of the major political forces, after he presented his credentials to President Zhelyu Zhelev last week. This week the U.S. ambassador had talks with Mr. Filip Dimitrov, leader of the Union of Democratic Forces, and the leadership of the ethnic Turks' Movement for Rights and Freedoms. Mr. Montgomery was received by President Zhelev yesterday.

Russian Envoy Views Problems of Debt Settlements

AU0411192693 Sofia BTA in English 1234 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] Sofia, November 4 (BTA)—At the moment all basic agreements, which the Soviet Union and Bulgaria have ever signed, are being reconsidered, Russia's ambassador in sofia Aleksandr Avdeyev said in a comprehensive interview for the 24 CHASA private paper. Private transactors have been increasingly gaining ground in the two countries' commercial relations, but there should be also structures that would help along private business—structures that are still non-existent in Russian-Bulgarian trade, Mr. Avdeyev said.

Russia has supplied to Bulgaria as much oil as the latter wanted supplied, there is no danger of suspending future oil deliveries, Russia's ambassador said in reply to a question. Concerning gas supplies, Bulgaria is practically receiving it free of charge, as no payments have been made since March, Mr. Avdeyev claimed. At the moment Bulgaria owes Russia about 52 million dollars. However, it is the Russian Government's political decision not to cut off its gas supplies, the reason being that winter is coming and Bulgaria has anyway been suffering substantial losses as a result of sanctions enforcement against Serbia and Montenegro, Mr. Aleksandr Avdeyev pointed out. Bulgaria can repay part of its debt—about 30-40 percent—by supplying Bulgarian goods to Russia, the ambassador said.

This month experts from the two countries will meet to specify the way of settling the two countries' outstanding debts. Maybe Russia's indebtedness to Bulgaria comes up to about 350 [figure as received] transferable roubles, but I cannot say what Bulgaria's convertible currency debt to Russia is, Ambassador Avdeyev said. "Anyway, the debt problems must be resolved because they weigh as heavy on the feet of Bulgarian enterprises as a ball and chain," he stressed. Feeling responsible for the unsettled payment of about 500,000 million [as received] due for the export of Bulgarian goods to the ex-Soviet Union in 1990-1991, the Russian side would like the problem straightened out as early as this year.

Ukraine Envoy: Economic Relations 'Show Some Progress'

AU0411180593 Sofia BTA in English 1603 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] Sofia, November 4 (BTA)—Economic relations between Bulgaria and Ukraine show some progress: In the first half of 1993 trade doubled from the same period of 1992, reaching 100 million dollars. The main obstacle is the lack of an interbank settlement agreement, Ukrainian Ambassador Oleksandr Vorobyov said at a news conference here today.

Kiev expects Presidents Zhelev and Kravchuk should find time for it in the coming months. To improve economic relations, Kiev will set up a trade mission in Sofia. Asked about gas and coal supplies from Ukraine, Mr. Vorobyov said his country would stand by intergovernmental agreements. There have been problems, but the agreements are in the interests of both countries and Ukraine has taken a responsible stand on them, Mr. Vorobyov said. The difference in the pace of reforms in Ukraine and Bulgaria is another setback for economic relations, according to the ambassador. Bulgaria has made greater headway with its reform, while Ukraine is more cautious and has opted for an evolutionary transition to a market economy, taking account of its social cost and trying to avoid social tensions, which exist anyway because of the economic crisis.

Klaus Interviewed on Balladur Plan, Security

PM0411152393 Paris LE MONDE in French 3 Nov 93 p 5

[Interview with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Martin Plichta and Yves-Michel Riols in Prague; date not given]

[Text] Prague—*Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus is expected in Paris on Thursday 4 November. In the interview which he granted us, he expressed reservations about the plan for a "security pact" which [French Prime Minister] Mr. Balladur is currently defending in Moscow.*

Vaclav Klaus has lost none of his assurance. Eighteen months after his right-wing party's victory in the elections, the first government chief of the young Czech Republic boasts of having the support of 73 percent of the population—"a result unheard of in a democratic country," he said proudly. This complete confidence, which is regarded as arrogance by his critics, is characteristic of this 52-year old economist.

"Now, 10 months later, it is already history," he said calmly about the division of Czechoslovakia. Primarily a pragmatist, the man his fellow citizens call "old skinflint," dismissed the "residual" problems linked with the division of the property of the defunct federation. Like [former British Prime Minister] Margaret Thatcher, whose photograph dominates his office at the foot of Prague Castle, Vaclav Klaus, the technocrat, shows no uncertainties. Like her, he has a horror of "big ideas." Edouard Balladur will soon have the opportunity to find this out because Vaclav Klaus makes no secret of his objections to the plan for a "pact for stability in Europe," proposed to the East European countries by the French prime minister.

"We are opposed to alternative courses in all spheres, in foreign policy, in domestic policy, and in the economy. There are many proposals of this kind, not only Mr. Balladur's, which put the cart before the horse. It is not possible to create one institution after another when we already have the Helsinki Conference and 'good old NATO,' even if it must of course be redefined following the fall of communism. Will this new structure not serve primarily to organize more summits and meetings of heads of government? We do not think this is the most effective way of ensuring security in this region. I am rather anxious when Europe, preoccupied and threatened by the Bosnian crisis, wants to create a security institution whose objective is to reduce the internal conflicts of other states. This is something which I distrust greatly. We are living in a country which is perhaps oversensitive in this respect because one of our 'big brothers' has already been able to decide what was bad for Czechoslovakia."

"The idea that a remote structure should analyze the internal situation of each country and might possibly venture to send in troops to solve the problem is a nightmare for me," Vaclav Klaus added. This is not really the proposal being made by Mr. Balladur who is suggesting that the East European countries should settle their disputes among themselves in a contractual form and does not involve any military element. But it is clear that the prime minister will have to win over an interlocutor who already has reservations.

Nor will he be able to count on Vaclav Klaus' support for the French position in the GATT negotiations because if the Czech prime minister has another nightmare, it is the Twelve's Common Agricultural Policy: "The more quickly it is rationalized the better." As for the "cultural exemption," Mr. Klaus, in accordance with the image which the Prague intellectuals have of him, says he is not "very well informed."

However, as a fierce advocate of free trade, Vaclav Klaus, like the other Central European leaders, makes no secret of his irritation at the European Union's "protectionism." It is also suspected of delaying tactics in insisting that these countries should first develop their regional economic cooperation before joining it. "We have already established a free trade area with our Central European neighbors, but, above all, we need to trade freely with the European Union," the Czech Government chief said.

It is a major issue for this little country of 10 million inhabitants, most of whose GDP comes from foreign trade. And yet, Vaclav Klaus, the architect of the economic reform, never misses an opportunity to boast of the surprising characteristic of his country which has one of the lowest unemployment rates in Europe with—officially—3.2 percent registered as seeking work. Is there therfore a "Czech miracle" in the transition toward a market economy? Even Jiri Dienstbier, a famous dissident who has now become one of Mr. Klaus' most virulent critics, admits that this country "which has always been between Svejk and Kafka, does things differently." But the agreement between the two men ends there. Instead of a "miracle," Jiri Dienstbier talks of a "Czech mirage" and attributes the low unemployment rate to the lack of any real restructuring in industry.

Not true, Mr. Klaus retorts: "The restructuring is going more rapidly here than in any other postcommunist country and much more rapidly than in Slovakia where the unemployment rate is 13.5 percent. There is an enormous potential for the absorption of new private enterprises, especially in the service industries. I do not deny that unemployment will increase, but not as rapidly as elsewhere."

The main reason why Vaclav Klaus refuses to intervene in industry's reorganization, his opponents say, is to prevent the support he has from being affected by the social consequences of these measures. The prime minister denies that, invoking ultraliberal principles: "The restructuring of enterprises must be carried out on the ground by the new owners who have emerged from privatization and not by bureaucrats," he said. "The government of this country does not have an industrial

policy; it does not want to organize, orchestrate, and design the restructuring from above. This is a crucial distinction from what is happening in other postcommunist states." Although the Czech method of mass privatization by the distribution of coupons is an undeniable popular success (six million shareholders), it has not brought the necessary capital for industry's modernization. Nor has it solved the serious problem of the mutual debts which the enterprises have inherited, here as elsewhere, from the old regime.

For the time being, Mr. Klaus' conservative coalition, spared by social unrest does not fear rejection, as has happened in Poland. Vaclav Klaus explains the victory of the former Communists in Warsaw essentially by "the weakness and division of the right," a risk which the Czech prime minister does not run, because he is undisputed master in his camp.

Zieleniec Comments on Possible NATO Membership

AU0411180793 Prague CTK in English 2001 GMT 2 Nov 93

[Text] Prague, Nov 2 (CTK)—Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec said today that the Czech Republic's eventual NATO membership would bring it not only advantages, but would also be a serious commitment. Speaking at a press conference, he said he did not entirely espouse Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus' opinion that the Czech Republic could become a NATO member without the Czech Army becoming part of the joint armed forces.

Klaus recently called rational and feasible the idea of former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that the Central and East European countries could be integrated into NATO gradually until they reached the present status of France. France is a member of the alliance, but its Army is not integrated into the joint armed forces.

Zieleniec said the suggestion was rather a theme for discussion, and warned against underestimation of the duties which would stem from the Czech Republic's NATO membership. Every path has its pros, but also many cons, Zieleniec said on Kissinger's variant supported by Klaus.

[Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech on 3 November on page 1, in a similar report under the title "According to Zieleniec, the Czech Republic Should Accept Obligations Arising From NATO Membership," adds: "According to Minister Zieleniec, the question of the Czech Republic joining NATO does not have to be discussed with Russia, which rejects the idea of the East European states joining this military grouping. 'I do not believe that Moscow is the key place where we should discuss our entry into NATO,' the minister stated.

"Zieleniec also commented on Friday (29 October) admission of the Czech Republic as a nonpermanent member of UN Security Council. According to him, it is the result of the successful transformation of our state and the diplomatic endeavors of Czech foreign policy. Zieleniec refused the notions that the Council membership carries with it increased demands on the Czech state treasury."]

Parties 'Satisfied' With Foreign Policy Talks

AU0411175193 Prague CTK in English 2344 GMT 2 Nov 93

[Text] Prague, Nov 3 (CTK)—The government coalition parties have confirmed identical opinions of most essential foreign political questions and agreed to create mechanisms to ensure coordination of their positions in the area, the chairman of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus said late last night.

The chairmen of the other three coalition parties—Josef Lux (Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party, KDU-CSL), Jan Kalvoda (Civic Democratic Alliance, ODA) and Vaclav Benda (Christian Democratic Party, KDS)—were also satisfied with today's talks.

Klaus stressed that the coalition by no means thought that it should coordinate everyday standard foreign policy which is within the powers of the Foreign Ministry and change the constitutional system.

We discussed intensifying the already existing mechanisms in the talks of the government and the coalition four. It is also true that another informal group has been set up, to take into consideration both constitutional and coalition aspects in the creation of coalition policy, Kalvoda added.

Zieleniec said that the mechanism is to be used in search for coherent positions by individual constitutional officials in the foreign political sphere and cooperation in the implementation of concrete foreign political goals.

Czech foreign policy has been criticized by some coalition representatives, opposition parties and the press for not being coordinated between the president, the government, and the parliament.

More Troops Leave for Former Yugoslavia

LD0411215293 Prague CTK in English 1330 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] Ceske Budejovice, Nov 4 (CTK)—A detachement of 77 Czech soldiers left today after boarding a plane at the Plana military airport near Ceske Budejovice. This completed the second stage of the rotation of Czech regiments serving in the United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia.

The Czech regiment will then have 519 troops, with another 19 Czechs employed in the UNPROFOR peace mission's operational staffs. The military police and a unit safeguarding the supply of provisions will each have six men.

The first party of soldiers forming part of the latest rota left for Zagreb, Croatia on October 19. Today's group was originally due to leave on October 29, but bad weather conditions forced a delay.

Training of the troops, which were moved to positions near Plitvice lakes, started in mid-September at a military base in Cesky Krumlov in south Bohemia.

Journalists Criticize Latest Police Directive

AU0411161293 Prague CTK in English 1352 GMT 2 Nov 93

[Text] Prague, Nov 2 (CTK)—A directive setting down rules of police behavior towards journalists during mass meetings aims to make life easier for the police as well as journalists, Police President Stanislav Novotny said at a press conference today. The directive, issued by the police board in mid-October, should help journalists to orientate themselves better, he added.

The directive requires that when in action, journalists be marked on the chest and back with distinct signs saying TISK or PRESS, in 15-cm high letters or larger. Journalists will have to comply with police orders, according to the directive, and produce their journalistic passes on asking. Under those terms, police cannot even use gentler means to restrict the journalists, and cannot seize their professional equipment and materials.

The Czech Syndicate of Journalists recently provided individual editorial offices with information saying that the directive was binding and that journalists must be marked during mass events.

Police board officials confirmed that the directive states explicitly that journalists must be... marked. They nonetheless rejected the view that journalists are required to comply with this instruction. It is police behavior towards journalists marked in the above way that the directive regulates, police said. If journalists want the police to treat them according to the directive, they must be marked, police spokesman Ales Svoboda said, adding that the Police Board is nonetheless considering a softer wording.

Military Service for Private Farmers Reduced

AU0411162293 Prague CTK in English 1858 GMT 2 Nov 93

[Text] Prague, Nov 2 (CTK)—Male owners of private farms would have the compulsory basic military service in the Czech Army reduced to five months, from October to February, Czech Defense Minister Antonin Baudys said at a press conference today. The compulsory military service now lasts 12 months.

The data presented by the farmers in their application forms, will be verified by district agrariar chambers, which should prevent efforts at the unlawful shortening of military service, Baudys said.

The most important condition to be met by the applicants is that farming be the main source of their living. If the applicant himself is not a farm owner, he will have to explain his relation to the owner.

The Czech Army wants to support newborn family farms, Baudys said. The above-mentioned regulation would stay in effect for several years, as long as it is needed. Baudys did not rule out that in future, the measure could be extended to other groups of recruits.

Meciar Comments on Process of Forming Government

LD0311234393 Prague CTK in English 2326 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] Bratislava, Nov 3 (CTK)—If Slovak President Michal Kovac does not accept any of the proposed ministers, not only the privatisation minister, then the whole proposal would be withdrawn, Slovak Premier Meciar told journalists today. Then the talks will have to be resumed or another conclusion must be drawn, Meciar added.

The proposed coalition government will be submitted to Kovac only on Friday, Meciar said. Meciar said that in view of the planned consultations with Kovac he could not rule out that the decision would be made only on Saturday.

The coalition agreement between Meciar's ruling Movement For a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) and the Slovak National Party (SNS) was concluded on October 19. The coalition will have 80 votes in the 150-seat parliament.

Several fruitless talks between the two parties have been conducted on the composition of the government since then.

Asked about the government structure, Meciar answered that one post would be assumed by a non-party member and that the education ministry would go to an SNS politician.

Meciar stressed that he knew neither any pragmatic objection nor any objection by President Kovac against Secretary of State to the Privatisation Ministry Ivan Lexa who had been proposed to run the ministry. Lexa, currently also director of the government office, has been strongly criticised by Slovak opposition for his incompetence.

As regards information about his being urged to dismiss Health Minister Viliam Sobona, Meciar said that the ministry had almost completed its task. Viliam Sobona will be the minister even next month, Meciar added.

Moravcik on Bilateral Agreements on Ethnic Rights

LD0511082393 Prague CTK in English 1924 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] Strasbourg, Nov 4 (CTK)—The Slovak capital, Bratislava, could become a meeting place for the committee in protection of ethnic minorities' rights, Slovak Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik said in the committee of ministers of the Council of Europe (CE) today.

He came out against the conclusion of bilateral interstate agreements dealing explicitly with the rights of ethnic minorities, for the time being at least.

Moravcik was reacting to the speech delivered by Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszensky who said that Hungary would welcome the conclusion of agreements on ethnic minority rights with its neighbours, similar to that concluded with Ukraine.

Moravcik said it would be expedient to work out a global study on the observance of ethnic minority rights in central Europe. Afterwards it might be possible to conclude bilateral treaties, he added. Moravcik said Slovakia would welcome a comparative analysis of ethnic minorities' rights in Central Europe and some Western European countries.

He could not give CTK any details on the contents of a letter sent by Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar to the European Parliament. The existence of the letter was announced by Pal Csaky, chairman of the parliamentary group of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (MKDH), at a press conference in Bratislava on Tuesday. The letter allegedly explains some statements Meciar made on September 3 at Spisska Nova Ves, East Slovakia, on crime, unemployment and the Romany issue.

Meciar's statements were criticised, both at home and abroad, as racist and fascist. Moravcik explained his lack of knowledge of the letter's contents by his absence from Bratislava of late.

Antall Expected To Return by 'Early Next Week'

LD0411235393 Budapest MTI in English 1933 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] Budapest, November 4 (MTI)—Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall is expected to return from medical treatment in Cologne this weekend or early next week, but no exact date has been set, said Government Spokeswoman Judit Juhasz, answering questions by the press on Thursday during an interval of the government session.

Antall has not yet replied to a letter by the Hungarian president about recent developments in Hungarian radio and television, Juhasz added. Antall is expected to study the situation and respond after returning home. Up to the briefing, the government had not discussed media affairs, Juhasz said.

Russian Science Minister on Possible Cooperation

AU0311143693 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 29 Oct 93 p 8

[Interview with Boris Saltykov, Russian minister of science and technical policy, by Laszlo M. Lengyel in Budapest; date not given: "We Still Keep Going"]

[Excerpts] Boris Saltykov was Russian deputy prime minister, and now he is the minister of science and technical policy. He granted NEPSZABADSAG an interview during his visit in Hungary.

[Lengyel] Your predecessor's visits to Hungary used to be natural, even if they did not always lead to tangible results. What justifies the dialogue today? What are the common subjects?

[Saltykov] When the Soviet Union ceased to exist, both you and we believed that we would live very well without each other. However, after two or three years, we realized that we also had valuable contacts. [National Scientific Development Committee Chairman] Erno Pungor visited Moscow a year ago and we agreed to only deal with things that are worth dealing with, like pharmaceutical research, medical science, and various agricultural branches. Hungary is strong in these areas. Another area is electronics, computer science, and robotics.

[Lengyel] What about space research?

[Saltykov] Hungary could be one of our European partners either within the European Space Research Agency or independently. Obviously, small countries cannot achieve anything in this field on their own. Hungary achieved considerable results in the planning and manufacturing of certain special instruments and installations in this field. [passage omitted]

[Lengyel] Regarding nuclear energy, Russia is simultaneously considered as a country that has achieved considerable results and a potential source of danger. What is your opinion about the future of this sector?

[Saltykov] We have a separate ministry dealing with nuclear energy, but the scientific program on safe nuclear energy belongs to us. New types of nuclear power plants are being designed in the framework of this program.

There is a deep economic crisis in Russia now and it is certain that we will not build new large-scale power plants in the coming four or five years.

[Lengyel] Will you modernize and reorganize the existing ones?

[Saltykov] For some time, we will only have the possibility to gradually shut down the most dangerous types and modernize the reactors that can still safely operate for 10-15 years. Most of our reactors are such reactors, and they will receive new control and safety systems. Hungary can also participate in this program.

[Lengyel] The West mostly fears the emigration of nuclear experts, all the more so because their knowledge also affects security policy spheres. At the same time, the technological intelligentsia quite clearly supports Yeltsin's policy. What can they expect in exchange for this support?

[Saltykov] This is perhaps the most difficult question for me and others dealing with scientific policy today. In spite of all the difficulties, we start from the premise that we must preserve the most valuable potential and we must financially support this as much as possible. We have created a special fund for the support of state scientific centers of federal importance this year. This affects 32-33 important research stations that used to belong to various financially strong ministries, like defense industry and aircraft engineering. In other words, these research stations enjoyed a secure financial basis before, a basis that they have now lost. We also provide financial support to the major institutions of nuclear research and nuclear industry, as well as theoretical physics research institutes. We provide 60-80 percent of the budget of the Kurchatov Institute, the Nuclear Physics Research Institute in Serpukhov, and several other important scientific centers. [passage omitted]

Fodor Quits FIDESZ, Resigns Parliamentary Mandate

AU0411184293 Budapest MTI in English 1330 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] Budapest, 3 Nov (MTI)—"I would like to announce today that as of December 1, I am resigning my parliamentary mandate, my membership and commissions in the Federation of Young Democrats," Gabor Fodor announced on Wednesday, at his press conference in Parliament.

Fodor, the vice-chairman of the opposition Federation of Young Democrats (FYD) [FIDESZ] and chairman of Parliament's Committee on Human Rights, Minority and Religious Affairs, also indicated he had notified the

speaker of Parliament, Gyorgy Szabad, and FYD Chairman Viktor Orban and FYD Board President Jozsef Szajer, about his decision by fax shortly before the press conference.

Fodor read a statement on his decision, and the reasons for it. He said the founding session of the FYD National Board (held on October 31, at which he lost out to Jozsef Szajer for the presidency) had confirmed him in his belief that the principles and order of values he represented from the very beginning and which could in any way considerably influence the policy of the Federation were no longer needed. The FYD has taken a direction that is unacceptable for me, he said.

In conclusion, Fodor said he chose December 1 to leave so he would have time to complete his affairs already in progress.

Basic Treaties With Croatia, Slovenia Ratified

LD0211202093 Budapest MTI in English 1907 GMT 2 Nov 93

[Text] Budapest, November 2 (MTI)—Parliament unanimously ratified Hungary's basic treaties with Croatia and with Slovenia on Tuesday.

Of former Yugoslavia, Hungary has grown closest to Croatia and Slovenia, Foreign Affairs State Secretary Andras Kelemen said.

Slovenia and Hungary have developed a wide-ranging cooperation and signed 13 inter-governmental and inter-ministerial agreements. These include agreements on trade contacts, on abolishing visa requirements, on opening new border posts, on curbing terrorism and crime, and on expulsion. Ljubljana's exemplary approach to national minority issues is particularly valued by Hungary. Slovenia has joined a Hungarian-Ukrainian minority statement. Minority issues are also covered by the Hungarian-Slovene Basic Treaty. Slovenia's parliament ratified the treaty in July.

Croatia hopes Hungary will help it regain territorial integrity. Budapest's ties with Zagreb are on the basis of nations' right to autonomy. Croatia has also joined the Hungarian-Ukrainian minority statement. Croatia's parliament has ratified the basic treaty.

Kwasniewski Discusses Coalition Options

AU0411131993 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 29 Oct 93 p 4

[Interview with Aleksander Kwasniewski, leader of the Democratic Left Alliance Club, by Agata Nowakowska and Piotr Najsztub; place and date not given: "I Have Considerable Influence"]

[Text] [GAZETA WYBORCZA] What was the result of the coalition negotiations? Has the PSL [Polish Peasant Party] come out of them on top? After all, at first you were supposed to become prime minister, but now the prime minister is Pawlak. You said that you would not give up the post of head of the Office of the Council of Minister, but you have.

[Kwasniewski] It is difficult to apply objective criteria in this case. Personnel questions are always the most difficult. When we started bargaining, we knew that we would not get everything we wanted. The PSL was not prepared to yield much ground on personnel matters. It often presented us with faits accomplis, and then held out, waiting for us to give.

At first, the PSL wanted us to create a minority government, but we did not agree to that. The PSL made the creation of a joint government conditional on Pawlak being prime minister. Then, traditionally, the head of the Office of the Council of Minister is one of the prime minister's people. I admit that we failed to retain control over the state administration, but Deputy Prime Minister Luczak, who we value very much, will see to that.

However, every government is geared toward the prime minister, and surely everyone understands that, now, the main responsibility—I would stress this—rests with the PSL and Pawlak. We will be an absolutely loyal partner.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] To put it simply, if this government fails, then the PSL will be responsible. So, is the composition of the government a success or a defeat for the SLD [Democratic Left Alliance]?

[Kwasniewski] That we head such ministries as finance, privatization, and social policy is a success today. Tomorrow, if we do not use this opportunity, it might be a defeat. We were not interested in figurehead roles in this government and that is why we are taking a risk.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] Who are you in the coalition government?

[Kwasniewski] I am chairman of the largest club in the Sejm, one that decides whether this government is a majority one or not.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] The coalition agreement contains a clause stating that the government will make political decisions following consultations between the PSL and SLD clubs.

[Kwasniewski] Including personnel appointments to posts of strategic importance for the state. The clauses look good on paper. It is not a matter of limiting the role of the president. It is a question of informing the government's parliamentary structure in advance of moves envisaged by the prime minister. The stability of the governing coalition also depends on the absence of surprises.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] What is meant by three ministries—foreign affairs, internal affairs, and national defense—being presidential? What influence will you have on them?

[Kwasniewski] To the extent envisaged by joint activity on the part of the Council of Ministers. They have the same obligations toward the the prime minister and the coalition government as the remaining ministers from the PSL and SLD.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] Will you appoint your own people to posts below the ministerial level in those ministries?

[Kwasniewski] Yes.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] Will the presidential ministers agree to that?

[Kwasniewski] Yes.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] The PSL accuses the SLD of treating this government as a shock absorber in the Belvedere manner. If this government fails, the SLD will make conciliatory gestures toward the Democratic Union [UD]. Friendly gestures, such as your struggle to have Professor Geremek appointed head of the Foreign Affairs Commission, are meant to placate the UD.

[Kwasniewski] We are closest to the UD. After all, there are also former party comrades in the UD, people who were in the party longer than I. It is true that they left the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party], but I dissolved it. So, who is better then?

The UD would be a good partner for government, with its specialists, prestige abroad, and favor with the media. In a UD-SLD government, the UD would guarantee continuity, and we would be the driving force behind change.

We now have a government with the PSL, but the SLD never closes any doors.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] Does that mean that you now have to form a government with those who want you, and if the UD responds positively to an olive branch, you will abandon your partner?

[Kwasniewski] Both the PSL and the UD are difficult partners for us, but the UD is the most difficult. The PSL is something of a class party, with a peasant party tradition. It is difficult for us to talk with them: Once they say "yes," and then it turns out that the answer is "no."

However, the UD is an even more difficult partner in view of its conviction about the special role that it has played in 20th century Polish politics.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] If the UD does not accept you, will you turn more resolutely toward the UP [Union of Labor]?

[Kwasniewski] In terms of program content, we can reach agreement with the UP. Today, the main obstacle is the attitude of the chairman of that party, Ryszard Bugaj. That is why the rapid formation of an alliance is impossible at the moment.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] What sources of friction are there in the PSL-SLD coalition?

[Kwasniewski] I do not want to make pessimistic forecasts at the very outset. However, I fear conflicts of a psychological kind in both the PSL and the SLD, between those in government and those who did not enter the government. I fear that if a minister comes to a deputy and says: "Look old man, this cannot be done that quickly," then he will reply that he will do it.... "Things are to be done the way voters want."

For example, the budget might be a disappointment for everyone: the farmers and the public sector. However, I hope that Minister Borowski will come up with some sensible compromise, and that Leszek Miller will able to reconcile people's expectations with what the state can afford.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] What is the source of this government's strength?

[Kwasniewski] The 35 percent of the vote that was cast for this government, the more than 300 deputies and 70 senators. Prime Minister Suchocka used to play the biggest game of political roulette in Europe, nervously looking round the hall to count the deputies.

Pawlak Government's Stand on Debt Unchanged

LD0411214793 Warsaw PAP in Poland 1318 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] Warsaw, 4 Nov—The Waldemar Pawlak government adopts the same stand in negotiations with commercial banks—Poland's creditors—as the previous cabinet.

After a meeting with Ernst-Moritz Lippe, new head of a working team of the London Club, Krzysztof Krowacki, government plenipotentiary for negotiations with banks, told PAP that an agreement on conditions for reducing Polish debt could be reached within 2-3 months. He added, however, that there were considerable differences of views during the meeting.

Oleksy Urges IMF 'Flexibility' on Budget

LD0511064593 Warsaw PAP in English 2017 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] Warsaw, Nov. 4—Sejm Speaker Jozef Oleksy, during a Thursday [4 November] meeting with IMF permanent representative in Poland Markus Rodlauer, pointed to the need for "more flexibility" in the fund's stance on Polish budget deficit, energy and fuel price hikes and cheaper credit. Negotiations to this effect are to start in mid-December, when an IMF mission will come to Poland, Oleksy told journalists after the meeting.

In Oleksy's opinion, certain criteria established by the IMF, such as, inflation control, must be satisfied. The point is that Polish economy must be assessed by its achievements and not by indices. Such an attitude would allow for making "a manoeuvre between the budget sections, indispensable to satisfy the minimum of social needs," Oleksy said.

He added that the funds willingness to cooperate with Poland, declared during last Wednesday's talks with Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak, assuaged concerns over the economic policy pursued by the Waldemar Pawlak government.

PC Reportedly Closer to Coalition With ZChN

LD0511013693 Warsaw PAP in English 1908 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] Warsaw, Nov. 4—During its Thursday's [4 November] debate, the main board of the Centre Alliance (PC) unanimously accepted a draft of a coalition agreement, that had been negotiated with the Christian National Union (ZChN) for a few weeks, PC deputy leader Ludwik Dorn told PAP. He added that the ZChN is expected to make the decision whether or not to sign the document during its board meeting on Friday.

The Peasant Agreement (PL) and the Party of Christian Democrats (PCHD) are also likely to sign, Dorn said adding that the agreement remains open to the movement for the Polish Republic (RDR), the Conservative Party (PK) and "Solidarity."

Asked whether the PC wants Jan Parys's movement of the Third Republic of Poland (RTR) to join the coalition, Dorn replied that "the foundations of the coalition are basically made of large parties."

The coalition agreement envisages that the member-parties will take a joint stance on the most important issues for the country, will appear jointly in elections and will have a coalition council.

Iliescu Calls For Interethnic, Economic 'Dialogue'

AU0411202693 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1725 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 4/11/1993—Romanian President Ion Iliescu ended his one-day visit in Harghita County with a meeting with local authorities. President Iliescu listened to the issues presented by local leaders concerning the inter-ethnic relations, economic and trade union activities. The president made an address urging to dialogue on all issues which could create conflictual situations.

The Romanian head of state said that the many ethnic groups living together in Romania was an advantage as this situation led to cultural enrichment. Ordinary people have found the common language of understanding and they have realized that their interest are common, irrespective their ethnic origin, President Iliescu said.

Referring to the situation of the Romanian economy, the Romanian head of state said that a slight improvement could be seen through a certain rise of the industrial production which could lead to an end of the economic decline.

Financial Officials Debate Monetary Policy

AU0411143293 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0936 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 4/11/1993—The policy of the National Bank of Romania has been in the focus of government circles and the press of late, while the national currency has been devaluing dramatically.

At the request of Stelian Marin, chairman of the Senate's budget and finance commission, Mugur Isarescu, governor of the National Bank, Finance Minister Florin Georgescu, and Minister of State Mircea Cosea [chairman of the Council for Economic Coordination, Strategy, and Reform] were invited to make explanations before the plenum of the Senate. The debates did not result in a concrete plan to redress the national currency, expected by some, or the incrimination of the National Bank governor, as publications of the opposition have alleged to have been the wish of part of the ruling party senators.

Following that, Senator Stelian Marin announced his resignation as chairman of the said commission. "I have resigned to show my protest. The current financial measures affect economy so much, that I can no longer accept this situation," Marin told daily ADEVARUL. He said that the activity of the commission he was head of made him feel "ashamed" considering "the current financial and hard currency situation of Romania." Mistakes have been made in the monetary system over the past two years, some of them have been intended to trigger the present disaster. In two years' time, 1991 and 1992, the banking credit in lei dropped by almost 3,000 billion lei in real terms. The 66 percent drop of the credit in only two years can explain all the difficulties the Romanian economy has been facing, added Marin. He said that he did not agree with 250 percent interests on overdrafts. "When one wants to redress, to develop, he does not apply a policy of expensive money (of credits—editor's note), but one of cheap money," mentioned Marin.

ADEVARUL also publishes the opinion of National Bank Governor Mugur Isarescu. "Not cheap, but devalued money, that's the term for what's going on in Romania. The difference between the interest rate and the inflation rate is so high that the leu is more and more distrusted. [no closing quotation mark as received] In Isarescu's opinion debates concerning inflation have to do with "outlooks on the way inflation can be fought. The drop in real credits in the Romanian economy is rather a result, not a cause, that is, the result of a slump in production, which has been caused by domestic and foreign factors. Referring to the former, Romania has lost more than half of its traditional markets. Then, the structural shocks that have affected the whole East-European area. As for domestic shocks, there has been disorganization and problems related to the transition. A proof that it is not a diminution in credits that has caused the slump in production, but the other way round, is that goods in store amounted to 25 percent of the national income in mid-1992," said Isarescu.

New Civic Alliance Party Program Reviewed

AU0311164193 Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER in Romanian 27 Oct 93 p 3

[Marina Roman article: "The PAC Has a Political Program: From Communism to Freedom"]

[Text] The Civic Alliance Party [PAC] has issued its political program. This program, which was promised at the Timisoara congress and was also presented to the major trade unions, was published last week. The PAC, which was set up on 1 August 1991, when a part of the members of the Civic Alliance—a nonparty political organization in Romania—considered it opportune to assume directly certain political responsibilities, describes itself as a party of neoliberal orientation based on civic, democratic, and moral values. The program has been entitled From Communism to Freedom, in accordance with the essence of its doctrine, based on the promotion of fundamental human rights and values and institutions of Romanian civic society.

Ample and comprehensive in the important areas of the political, economic, and social system, the program will be completed, according to the PAC leaders, in such a way as to make areas of vital importance such as education and culture benefit from its solutions as well.

The crisis—"this moving from bad to worse, represents first of all an effect of the disruption of the democratization process by a corrupt and irresponsible oligarchy, with the purpose of perpetuating privileges of the former communist superstructure"—is the common factor in

the analysis of the civilian society and of the political and economic situation that is made in the first part of the program. Regarding the civic situation, the disappearance of communist regimes left behind "an appalling devastation." The analysis of the causes that brought about the appearance of totalitarian regimes and the analysis of their effects leads to the conclusion that the situation in ex-communist Romanian society is most serious. Romanian communism represented a true system of the evil in which the state, school, Army, and the church were turned into "regimentation and control instruments." In fact, the goal of communism coincides with the initial moment of the human condition: "an ideological art and an artistic ideology." In accordance with the analysis made by the PAC, at the institutional level the political crisis transpires in two forms: "the communist restoration," which started "about seven to eight hours after Ceausescu's overthrow, when the leaders of the new regime spoke out in favor of values of socialism 'soiled' by their predecessors," and the second form, the political parties, whose emergence—after 45 years of indoctrination with the supposition that the party-state represents the only legitimate and desirable power—provoked a general reaction of "stupor and discontent." The parliament has finally acquired a multiparty configuration only after the 27 September 1992 elections. The political crisis also took the form of "government crises" because those in power—disregarding the inalienable and undisputable right of the civic society to eliminate from power a government that proves to be inadequate for current times and circumstances—demonstrated that their only concern is "to perpetuate privileges and ensure their irremovability." "This propensity toward authoritarianism and dictatorship of the post-communist regime represents the major obstacle that blocks Romania's evolution toward pluralism and democracy." As far as the economic crisis is concerned, the PAC program lists the following causes: malfunctions of a structural nature accumulated in the period of the comprehensively developed socialist society and the leadership's lack of political will to implement the reform.

The second part of the PAC program also aims at defining another relationship between state and society because in Romania the state continues to be represented by a "communist or neocommunist oligarchy." The PAC believes that "it is imperative to review the current constitution." The model of semi-presidential republic is considered inadequate for Romania and the modification of the president's duties is necessary. The principle of separation of power in the state should be sanctioned and any revision of the Constitution aimed at suppressing or limiting the fundamental human rights should be prohibited. As was only to be expected, the largest part of the program is devoted to economic solutions, in a chapter entitled: From a State Economy to a Market Economy. It is clear that in Central and East Europe, the emergence of economic difficulties endangers the pace and course of democratic changes. Also in this chapter of its program, PAC is consistent with the neoliberal doctrine. For the first measures to halt inflation, the PAC proposes the following: to liberalize the exchange rate, prices, and salaries; to practice positive interest rates and to put a stop to the government's interference in the monetary policy of the National Bank; and to ensure the correlation of the monetary fund with the real dynamics of production and investments. Another step toward a market economy and an essential way to disengage and accelerate the economic reform is to decentralize the government institutions and consolidate local administration. As is known, PAC, as a member of the Democratic Convention of Romania, has been trying to include on the agenda of parliament the urgent discussion and approval of two laws: the law on local patrimony and the law on local public finances.

Measures of social protection are also part of the policy promoted by the PAC in its program.

P.S. We have a question: "Will the (neo)liberal doctrine bring the parties that claim to follow it closer to each other?"

Foreign Media Bulletin: Balkan Crisis 5 November
WA0511191793

The following is an overview of current FBIS reporting on events in the Balkans. It supplements other FBIS reporting and consists primarily of selected summaries of longer reports. For reference purposes, serial numbers of the longer reports are provided.

SUMMARY

Serbian President Milosevic orders arrest of members of Seselj's Serbian Radical Party ... UNPROFOR reports widespread looting in Vares by Bosnian Army troops.

POLITICAL

MILOSEVIC ORDERS ARREST OF SRS MEMBERS (AFP): Serbian President Milosevic orders arrest of 18 "militants" in paramilitary leader Seselj's Serbian Radical Party on charges of "terrorism, murder, and banditry." (AU0511123793)

MILITARY

BOSNIAN ARMY LOOTING IN VARES (AFP): UNPROFOR officials say "undisciplined" Bosnian Army troops "looting" homes in recently captured Vares, blocking food convoys to refugees. (AU0511111893)

NOTICE TO READERS

With the 10 November issue, the daily publication of the Balkan Crisis Bulletin will be suspended. Further publication of the bulletin will be on an irregular basis, as events in the area dictate, and may be resumed on a daily basis if circumstances warrant.

Izetbegovic Comments on Changes in Army

AU0411192393 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1603 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Interview with Bosnia-Herzegovina President Alija Izetbegovic by Vladimir Bilic, editor in chief of Bosnia-Herzegovina Television, on 4 November; place not given—live or recorded]

[Text] [Bilic] Mr. President, I propose that we begin with the most topical issues in our republic at present. Judging by everything, this is Vares and the situation there. Can you explain to the viewers and listeners of Bosnia-Herzegovina Radio and Television what is currently happening in Vares, and what your view of the situation is?

[Izetbegovic] According to the latest information, the Army is entering Vares. Vares has not been taken by us yet. There is some confusion there at present. Civilians have found themselves unsure what to do. They have been urged by the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] to leave the town; that is, the Croatian population has. We are asking them to stay in the town. Nothing will happen to them. However, I am afraid that the people have been manipulated there. The aim of our action in Vares was to prevent another Stupni Do. As you know, the HVO carried out a treacherous attack on that village, committed genocide. We could not allow this to happen again. There was a danger of this being done in the village of Dastanski, Dastansko. The danger was real, unfortunately.

I believe that the Army will carry out its job there in a completely correct way, that it will protect all the population, regardless of their religion, which is what it should do.

[Bilic] First there was some talk about the 2d Corps entering the town. What is being said now is that it is the units of the 3d Corps that are entering Vares.

[Izetbegovic] This was a joint action by the 2d and the 3d Corps. This is a joint action. The army is entering the town from three sides. As you know, a moderate HVO unit was stationed there. This unit did not cause any problems until the arrival of those from Kiseljak, lead by the criminal [Ivica] Rajic [head of Croatian forces in region], who replaced the local HVO leadership. He came with some 600-700 fighters and caused chaos in the town and around it. A stop had to be put to it.

As you know, we have warned and are still pursuing activities to ensure lawful conduct. [sentence as heard] Our army will not destroy places of worship or kill any of the population. However, there are manipulations; the population, the Croatian population, does not know who to trust—the Army, or the threats and warnings by the HVO that they will be subjected to reprisals and so forth.

Of course, our army will not do anything of the kind. We will make sure that no troubles occur there.

[Bilic] Is all this connected with the latest speech by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and what he proposed as a solution to the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Izetbegovic] I do not know whether this is closely connected or not. It is more connected with the general strategy of Croatia, with an erroneous policy of Croatia in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the result of which was the promotion of [Bosnian Croat leader Mate] Boban and his Herzeg-Bosna, which Croatia supported wholeheartedly, of course. This is a policy of noncooperation with Bosnia-Herzegovina, a policy of rift between the Muslim and the Croatian people that was conducted by Croatia here. So, this is a long term policy that has yielded black fruit in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Bilic] One could freely talk about some kind of Croatia's guardianship stand toward Bosnia-Herzegovina. The same applies to what Mr. Tudjman said about everything, especially his views on some future Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Izetbegovic] Yes, Mr. Tudjman's interference has exceed the limits of interference in our internal relations. This was done under the pretext of protecting the interests of the Croatian people. As one can see, this policy was in fact the most damaging for the Croatian people, because, before the direct and fairly brutal interference, so to speak, they did not have any problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Problems arose after that. Radicalization occurred in the HVO and they started to cooperate openly with chetniks, according to the plan for breaking up Bosnia-Herzegovina, which President Tudjman has wholeheartedly been supporting for some time.

[Bilic] While we are talking, I am thinking about the latest decisions of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina which have, to put it simply, strengthened the citizens' confidence in the state and in the law and order. After the session, two local commanders that have sunk most into lawlessness and crime have been removed and this was continued yesterday with the arrest of 36 offenders of a (?somewhat) smaller caliber. Therefore, the action is continuing. How do you assess what has been done so far and what do you expect will happen in the near future? Is all that connected with filling the vacancies in the Presidency and the election of Dr. Haris Silajdzic as prime minister?

[Izetbegovic] Well, I would not say that this is not connected at all, but it is not much connected. As you know, the action, that is, the decision to take this action against crime was made much earlier, at least the decision about the preparations for the action. The very decision on the action was made a few hours before the action itself, that is, late in the evening of the 25th [of October]. The action took place early in the morning of 26 October. However, the preparations had to be made earlier and started about 10 days previously. We even had to bring a unit to Sarajevo because of that. Therefore, this very action against crime was planned beforehand. Of course, it should have been taken much sooner

and it is a special question why it could not be taken even earlier. Anyhow, the decision was made earlier on and it has nothing to do with the formation [as heard]. This was a special activity aimed at filling vacancies in the Presidency and, of course, forming a new government. The new government was formed after the action had already been concluded. The action took place on the 26th and the formation of the new government occurred on the 28th.

[Bilic] The prime minister designate was appointed.

[Izetbegovic] Yes, the prime minister designate was appointed. Of course, on that one day he did actively participate in the implementation of this decision. However, the government itself did not participate in it as it did not legally exist at that time.

As regards these new Presidency members, as you know, they had taken the oath a day or two earlier, it seems to me, and of course they agreed with this decision because the decision was adopted unanimously. This is where their role mainly lay.

However, the preparations were much more extensive. This action included the entire city and was not meant to be taken in Stari Grad alone but throughout the city. Of course this was to be done in stages. This second stage was completed yesterday morning. It was a little less extensive, as it involved only a couple of criminals in Novi Grad and Novo Sarajevo. By the way, what one must stress here is that this action was by no means directed against these two brigades, as is frequently being mentioned. Unfortunately, these two brigades are being mentioned. It was directed against a section of the command [words indistinct].

[Bilic] As before, the soldiers have remained on their positions in the [words indistinct].

[Izetbegovic] Absolutely. We were saying all the time that the soldiers, that the brigades on the whole have nothing to do with that. You see, this brigade resembles a big apple, a part of which was rotten and had to be cut away. Everything else is healthy and continues fighting. The chetniks have tried one test. No, not one, these were two tests. They attacked the lines of the 10th Brigade after this [action]. They were testing the brigade's combat capability, but this capability has remained unaffected, and I think the it even increased. The chetniks carried out two very strong attacks two or three days after this action, and then three days later they did it again. However, they were met with [words indistinct] and in this respect there were no problems.

You know, one sometimes has this need to weed one's garden. Some very important and useful plants are growing there, but there are weeds that should occasionally be pulled out. This time we had to pull out these weeds because they have unfortunately taken root there where.... [pauses] Within the command [words indistinct]. The investigation is under way. It [words indistinct] results, that is, we have uncovered things that.... [pauses] We did know some things before and [words indistinct] with them and some we did not know and so on. That was [words indistinct] and the public will be told about this.

However, we [words indistinct] big problems. We were not aware that it was spread to that extent there, and that the commanders of these brigades would decide to resist the legal authorities. We calmed the situation. We decided to on some other occasion.... [pauses] We in fact tried to postpone the entire action in the hope that the war would end. We could then carry out our internal purges after the war.

However, events assumed a different course. Crime was increasing all the time [words indistinct] and especially lawlessness and violence against the population. This was intolerable. I thought that it was high time (?something was done). We will, of course, need to give an explanation as to why this had not been possible earlier. It was simply impossible to (?accomplish) with success.

[Bilic] Will the action on rooting out crime continue?

[Izetbegovic] Yes, we have issued orders that similar actions be taken throughout the Army. Of course, the action.... [pauses] The crime is not common [?in the army] but among the civilians, population. Unfortunately, it took root among the military. Armed men sometimes do not use their arms and power in the best way. So, the action will continue within the 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th and other Corps. The action will be continued.

Fortunately, except in certain sections of the 6th Corps, and some sections of the 3d Corps, this phenomenon of crime has not taken deep root, but it is very pronounced in the Konjic region. There are similar things here and there in Zenica, too. Fortunately, they are not as acute as was the case here.

[Bilic] Two days ago, there were significant changes in the personnel of the leadership of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Commanders of three corps were changed. A new chief of the General Staff was appointed. Mr. President, can you tell us how and why this was done, considering that the official statement is not very informative. Citizens know very little about it.

[Izetbegovic] The main change, the one that caused most comment, is the replacement of the chief of the General Staff. This is no longer Sefer Halilovic. This is now Enver Hadzihasanovic, who has been commander of the 3d Corps until now. This was.... [pauses] The investigation revealed certain things that made Sefer Halilovic unsuitable to continue his duties as the chief of the General Staff. The results of the investigation will be presented soon. I cannot speak about them here in the interest of the investigation, but what has been established as certain—let us cut all the stories short and counter rumors in the town, leave this aside and look at the facts, the facts that have been established with certainty—is that the change had to be made in the interest of the army, in the interest of security, the army,

commanding, and so forth. Therefore, the facts will, of course, be presented when the time is ripe for this.

In the meantime, in order for things in the army to flow normally, a new man assumed the post of chief of the General Staff. As regards the commanders of the corps, one should say that the changes in the 3d Corps followed the departure of Enver [Hadzihasanovic] as commander of the 3d Corps. He had to be replaced by a new man. As regards changes in the 4th and 5th Corps, they took place on the basis of proposals made by the commanders themselves. Ramiz Drekovic [commander of the 5th Corps] has insisted on several occasions over the last 10-15 days on a change, and personally proposed to leave the post, because he had come to the conclusion that the fighting against Abdic is suffering somewhat because of the fact that Drekovic was not from the Krajina, from that area. People from the Krajina are a little sensitive in this respect. Abdic actually began to exploit the fact that Drekovic was not from Krajina. Drekovic thought that it would be better to go to some other place.

We were a bit hesitant about this, but when he repeated his request, we accepted it. This change has already been made. Drekovic transferred his duties to a new man, I think Dudakovic. He is also a very efficient commander of a brigade in Krajina. He comes from Dubica. So, if this played any role, it has been resolved in this way. We will see what will happen now. Drekovic is a man in whom we have absolute confidence. There are no problems with him whatsoever. The reasons here are of a completely different nature in comparison with the replacement of the chief of the General Staff.

[Izetbegovic] As for the....

[Bilic, interrupting] Commander of the 4th Corps.

[Izetbegovic] Commander of the 4th Corps, Arif Pasalic, he has been proposed—of course, this appointment still has not been [word indistinct], it is still in process—for an assistant, for the second most important man in the Defense Ministry. Our intention is to strengthen the Defense Ministry. As you know, the concept is such that we will appoint a civilian person to head [the Ministry], we want to give it a try with a civilian—that is the way it is done in most civilized countries in the world, even in war time a civilian heads the national defense, and generally in war, in all civilized countries, a civilian heads the Defense Ministry—more or less because of the duties involved: logistics, mobilization, and the like; however, the military factor also needs to be strongly represented here because of a number of expert duties that are involved.

Therefore, we have decided to appoint Pasalic to this office. That was the reason why.... [pauses] Pasalic himself expressed the wish to transfer to the Defense Ministry; some of it is due to the fact that he was exhausted down there; he has been down there for a long time now, in this confrontation with the HVO, longer perhaps than the public is aware, because the confrontation has been going on, it goes back at least a year, it does not go back to 9 May, which is when the attack began on, the confrontation between the Army and the HVO [words indistinct]. It began....

[Bilic, interrupting] That was the placing of units....

[Izetbegovic, interrupting] Yes, it began as far back as October last year. We tried to postpone this conflict there, and we managed to postpone it until May, but then in May the perfidious attack, so to speak, began. Therefore, Arif is a tired man, tired from a conflict that went on almost nonstop, down there on the Mostar front. [Words indistinct] his deputy is in his place. We have already agreed that in the future—when it comes to personnel issues—we would change people in a somewhat shorter procedure, we would give new people a try, who... if one set does not work well, we will change it very quickly, both in the government and in the [words indistinct].

[Bilic] Is the appointment of a new military attorney general, military judiciary, also connected to this?

[Izetbegovic] Well, yes. Of course, all this is part of one single project, which is the strengthening of law and order in the state. Namely, we registered certain weaknesses in the work of the military public prosecutor's office and the military courts. In addition to all that they had and the results they achieved, and so forth, we noticed several weaknesses that required more trustworthy people in these posts. I believe that in the personalities of these two people, whom I received yesterday, we have found two people who can guarantee that the law will be thoroughly observed. We insist on strictly and energetically prosecuting all offenses [nepravilnosti], but we also insist that the law is strictly observed, that there are no lapses as regards persons who are imprisoned or are under investigation, or even at informative talks. These two people guarantee this because they are experienced attorneys and judges.

[Bilic] We are nearing the end of this interview; I have to ask you this: it is quite evident that both sides carried out aggression against the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Could you please state your stance as regards sanctions against the Republic of Croatia, and, another thing, will Bosnia-Herzegovina agree to the aggressor side's proposal, combined with the blackmail calling for 500 liters of oil per month until the port of Bar is opened, which was proposed by the war criminal Radovan Karadzic?

[Izetbegovic] As regards sanctions, they have been studied in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for some time, all the repercussions and implications of such a decision, you know. This is not a one-sided decision. This decision could have adverse effects on Bosnia-Herzegovina. We are studying possible gains and losses from such a request, because from the moral side of this, the moral political justification for such a measure exists. There is no doubt about this. It is only a question of whether this decision is politically opportune at present. This issue is being studied; it is very complicated.

Namely, that is not, we must simply, I believe that we would be granted this without any problems.

Earlier, there were dilemmas as to whether they [the sanctions] would—since they would severely hit the Croatian people—strengthen the position of the radical elements in Croatia, whether they would strengthen rather than weaken Boban's position.

[Bilic] And endanger our refugees?

[Izetbegovic] And endanger our refugees, and so forth. Namely, there is a process in Croatia, there are both democratic and radical forces that are somewhere on the brink of fascism, or maybe I should say, on the brink of some bolshevik fascism or fascist bolshevism, whichever you prefer; I would never assess this as being purely fascism, it is a mixture, an ugly mixture. Therefore, we wanted to avoid taking a measure that might strengthen these forces, which are negative, because the democratic forces in Croatia are very strong. We should not make their work in Croatia more difficult for them. (?Theoretically), the sanctions would actually aid the forces that are against Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Croatian people would see this as an attack against them, because we... this was a very sensitive issue. However, maybe things have reached the point where we have to apologize to the Croatian people for having to make this move, particularly if news is confirmed—like yesterday—that units, elements of the Croatian Army are participating in the Vares action. If this is confirmed, we will have no choice but to demand that sanctions be imposed on Croatia.

[Bilic] In any case we must insist on the agreement between yourself and Mr. Tudjman, and on the first three points that are the most important for relations between the two republics?

[Izetbegovic] Yes, we must naturally insist upon this, but the willingness of only one side is not enough. We do not meet the readiness to implement this on the other side. You see, the matters become complicated when we started debating the exchange of prisoners. As you know, the exchange of prisoners in Mostar did not succeed. Why not? They simply [hold] 700 to 800 of our young men who are not on any list, either the list of alive or dead, just as they would have vanished, and we could not have ignored this fact. Some 700 to 800 people were imprisoned there, (?they were caught sleeping) on the critical night of 9 May when they had cowardly attacked us, the [word indistinct] units...

[Bilic] The Croatian side?

[Izetbegovic] Yes, from the right bank of the Neretva River. They were lifted from their beds, imprisoned, and taken away. The greatest number of them were precisely these people—young people between 20 and 30 years of age who do not appear on any list. They could not explain where these people were. At a certain stage in these talks, we (?insisted) that they at least tell us where these people were. They did not need to be released at that very moment, although, as you know [word indistinct] all for all. However, despite this all for all, the above-mentioned people were not on their list. This naturally, provoked the revolt of our citizens there and of the relatives of these men, so the exchange had to be halted and everything got stranded. Subsequently, they have taken our helicopters in Medjugorje, which was an absolutely illegitimate action, because we had liberated their injured men from Bijela, I think that [words indistinct], however, when our helicopters arrived to pick up our injured men in Medjugorje they were stopped and these helicopters are still there. Therefore, this is an attitude that is completely contrary to the declaration that myself and Tudjman have signed there to pave the way to the cease-fire, exchange of prisoners, and convoys. Therefore, those where the three points that were of crucial importance. It was their fault that this was halted.

The talks are now being held, again, to overcome the difficulties, because the entire process that was supposed to lead toward the liberation of thousands of people who live in horrendous conditions in those camps has been blocked. We are sometimes really in two minds—if we yield, then we are doing this at the expense of the people who are detained and of whose fate we know nothing, but if we remain firm in this respect, thousands of people who could have been liberated cannot be liberated. This is a matter of principle that we cannot bypass. We demanded that they tell us at least what has happened to these people. However, they would not answer. A justified suspicion arises that these people might have been killed. We fear this, and that is why we insist that if these people are alive they be registered with the Red Cross, because this is, nevertheless, a precaution measure for their survival.

[Bilic] Finally, I would ask you about the modification of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency platform. When will this happen and what does it actually involve?

[Izetbegovic] Namely, it has been thought that, with the situation as it is, the platform of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency should be reexamined once again, that is, the prevailing platform that, as you know, was passed on the basis on which it has been created, is an undivided and integral Bosnia-Herzegovina. Under the pressure of events and the military situation—the negotiations that were held there, as you know—a certain deviation from this platform has occurred, therefore, that agreement was not signed over there. However, another platform has emerged [word indistinct] that [words indistinct] the constitutional concept of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I am talking about the concept of a union. We are now in a situation in which we have to finally decide between the two options. What shall we tell the people they are fighting for, what shall we say [word indistinct] for what kind of Bosnia-Herzegovina are they fighting? What are our military objectives? We will, thus, reexamine this and then either reassert the prevailing platform or redefine and modify it in a certain way. This is something

that will be a subject of further debates in the Presidency as soon as the delegation that has left for Germany returns.

You know that [word indistinct] a parliamentary delegation departed for a visit to the European Parliament in Strasbourg and to some other countries, which was inevitable. It is necessary that Bosnia-Herzegovina appears on the international scene, especially that deputies, the people from the parliament, appear, and not only the presidency as the bearer of authority, but the parliament as the bearer of national sovereignty should also appear. They will return in approximately four to five days. This will be a short trip, after which we will begin this debate. It would have been good if this were a general debate, if it could only be organized, but this will not be possible and we will probably organize a debate in the parliament, with the deputies here in Sarajevo, in Zenica, in Bihac, in Tuzla, in Mostar, and so forth, and then we will try to gather the results of these debates and....

[Bilic] And incorporate them here?

[Izetbegovic] Yes, also here in political parties. And then naturally, we will transfer this into the Presidency and pass certain decisions that will determine the future course of Bosnia-Herzegovina and define our war aims, the political and military aims we are fighting for. At this moment I cannot say how this platform will look, but it will probably, [word indistinct] decision between the two possible options above.

As I can see now, most of the people will nevertheless advocate an undivided Bosnia-Herzegovina. I believe that such is the prevailing atmosphere. I will soon go on a tour of Bosnia-Herzegovina to see and hear what people think there. [Words indistinct] Mostar, I must go [words indistinct].

[Bilic] We did not answer a part of the question regarding Karadzic and the proposal.

[Izetbegovic] Oh, yes.

[Bilic] [words indistinct], Bar harbor, and so forth....

[Izetbegovic, interrupting] No, no, we here....

[Bilic] The eastern corridor....

[Izetbegovic] Naturally, we do not like this blackmail with oil. However, I do not think that we will oppose the opening of another corridor there in principle. In this way, we would remove Croatian blackmail of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This blackmail should be removed. They live in a belief that we simply cannot do without them there and I believe that sometimes, not only sometimes, but very often they abuse this situation, namely, that we are blocked. I believe that this corridor should be opened, this is my opinion, regardless of these 500,000 tonnes of oil, because this blackmail by the Croatian side must be overcome. We must have another exit, a corridor from the other side.

We will and we should do everything for our people, who are on the verge of starvation, especially in Mostar, and this corridor would primarily help Mostar more than Sarajevo and central Bosnia, although it would link us with Sarajevo, it would primarily help Mostar. We must secure food for those 50,000 to 60,000 people who are encircled there—also, clothing, shoes, and other humanitarian requirements—and I believe that we, nevertheless, will not oppose the opening of the corridor. We have numerous reasons to accept it.

[Bilic] Thank you for the interview, Mr. President.

Vares Croats Appeal to Serbs for Help

LD0411222093 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2125 GMT 4 Nov 93

["Pool" item]

[Text] Brgule, near Vares, November 4 (TANJUG)—Mayor of the Croat-dominated Municipality of Vares in the central part of the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina Ante Pejcinovic appealed to the Serb republic for help on Thursday evening [4 November] because the town was under attack by formations loyal to Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic.

'We managed to get the civilians out of the town and most of them are in the surrounding woods,' in Serb-held territory around the village of Brgule, Pejcinovic told TANJUG.

"Several objects are burning in the town. Yesterday (on Wednesday), they (the Muslims) set fire to the bakery and a silo and some other buildings, while there is thick smoke over the town itself," Pejcinovic said.

The mayor also said that the surrounding Croat villages had been burned to the ground and that around 10,000 of the villagers had managed to escape, while "those who can fight have remained to defend that to which we are now trying to hold on."

Muslim forces on Wednesday seized Vares from the Croats, Zagreb-based Croatian radio reported. Thousands of Croats were forced to flee, and they found refuge in the territory of the Serb republic, the state of the Serb people in former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The British news agency REUTERS said that 15,000 Croats had fled from the villages around Vares. Pejcinovic said that 35,000 Croat refugees had passed through Vares.

The local commander of the Croatian Defence Council, the HVO, Kresimir Bozic told TANJUG: "The Second and Third Corps of the Muslim army have been launching strong attacks on Vares for several days and the HVO must now move to reserve positions since the enemy is more numerous."

"Despite all the difficulties, we are currently consolidating a new line of defence of that part which borders on Serb territory, which is some five kilometers wide," Bozic said.

UN Officer Likens Army to 'Band of Thieves'

AU0411165193 Paris AFP in English 1639 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Excerpts] Vares, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Nov 4 (AFP)—Moslem-led troops triumphantly entered this abandoned Croat stronghold Thursday [4 November] but marred their biggest victory in a central Bosnian offensive with a rash of theft and plundering.

"It's more like a madhouse," said Swedish Colonel Olf Henricsson, commander of the UN battalion here as Bosnian troops celebrated by shooting their machine-guns in the air throughout Vares.

Henricsson said that 500-1,000 soldiers moved into the town from the south, starting Thursday morning, and hundreds more were massing on the southern outskirts.

The first troops received a joyous welcome from Moslems in Vares, particularly some 230 held prisoner in a school before the Croats hastily pulled out late Tuesday. [passage omitted]

But the euphoria turned to tension as many of the soldiers began to plunder aready gutted shops and stole dozens of abandoned cars in their move through the town 30 kilometres (18 miles) north of Sarajevo. Henricsson said the soldiers were behaving "like a gangster band or a band of thieves."

About 60 of his men from the Nordic UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) battalion, patrolling in armoured personnel carriers, spent the day discouraging looters at gunpoint.

UNPROFOR troops had to fire in the air to stop the plunder of a UN warehouse filled with food and other vital items for refugees. An armoured personnel carrier blocked the door. The Swedish troops called for reinforcements but a company of more than 120 French soldiers only arrived late in the afternoon from Sarajevo after being held up by minefields. [passage omitted]

Nearly 700 refugees, mostly Moslems but also some Croats and Serbs, were holed up in the camp of Swedish UNPROFOR troops at the north end of Vares.

The Bosnian move to take Vares appeared aimed at securing before winter the government's supply lines in its industrial heartland from the cities of Zenica in the centre to Tuzla in the northeast. It was a major success for troops of the Sarajevo government, which has pressed a campaign in central Bosnia since rejecting an international plan for the ethnic partition of the former Yugoslav republic in late September.

A spokesman for the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees said in Sarajevo that a French aid worker was wounded and his locally-hired translator killed when their ambulance hit a mine as they attempted to help refugees fleeing the fighting in the Vares area.

Looting Reported in Vares

AU0511111893 Paris AFP in English 1103 GMT 5 Nov 93

[Text] Sarajevo, Nov 5 (AFP)—Undisciplined Bosnian army troops have looted homes in the captured Croat-pocket of Vares and blocked a UN food convoy to a group of refugees including Croats, UN military and aid officials said Friday [5 November].

At one point Thursday local commanders from the mainly-Moslem Bosnian army asked UN Protection Force troops to help them control the situation but the request was turned down.

Troops from the Bosnian army's seventh brigade began looting televisions and audio equipment from deserted homes after seizing Vares on Wednesday, said Lt Col Bill Aikman, spokesman for the UN Protection Force here.

"We have received reports of systematic looting in the sense of televisions, stereos, you name it, being moved out," Aikman said. "The second corps coming from the north advised UNPROFOR forces in the area in the afternoon that they were concerned about the situation in the town of Vares and asked them to help resolve the situation.

"We are not in the business of trying to control corps of armies of any party in the conflict, so we could not do that," Aikman said. The spokesman said he had been told a battalion of Bosnian police was being sent to the area Friday to help restore the situation.

Ray Wilkinson, spokesman for the office of the UN High Commissoner for Refugees here, said that one local Bosnian army commander had complained to aid workers that his own home had been looted by the seventh brigade.

Several hundred troops from the seventh brigade Thursday blocked a UN convoy carrying food supplies to 620 refugees, including around 100 Bosnian Croats, sheltering at the camp of Scandinavian UN troops a few kilometres (miles) north of Vares. The convoy was only allowed through after the arrival of French UN troops sent from Sarajevo.

UN Troops Return Fire After Sarajevo Attack

AU0411153393 Paris AFP in English 1417 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] Sarajevo, Nov 4 (AFP)—UN troops returned fire after coming under attack near the Sarajevo headquarters of UN Bosnia commander General Francis Briquemont, a military spokesman said Thursday [4 November].

A UN armoured personnel carrier was hit by anti-aircraft rounds in central Sarajevo on Wednesday, said U.N. Protection Force spokesman Bill Aikman.

As it left the residency around 5:30 p.m. (1630 GMT) the troop carrier "came under heavy fire from what seemed to be 20mm anti-aircraft fire from high up in the hills," he said. That would indicate that Serb forces who have been besieging Sarajevo for the past 18 months were behind the attack.

Aikman said U.N. troops fired some 120 rounds back at their attackers, and shell fragments were found in the residency compound but no one was hurt, Aikman said.

Bihac Officials Protest UNPROFOR Actions

AU0411205993 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] A news conference was held in the building of the Bihac Regional Assembly yesterday. Hamdija Kobeljagic, chairman of the Assembly, acquainted journalists with the text of a protest note sent to the Security Council, UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali, and General Briquemont, commander in chief of UN forces in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, via the government, the Presidency, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the unacceptable attitudes of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] toward members of a high-level state delegation of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The protest note sent to UNPROFOR states that the high-level state delegation of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina—comprising Mustafa Ceric, head of the Islamic community of Bosnia-Herzegovina; Irfan Ljubijankic, the new foreign minister of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina; Mirsad Ceman, president of the Party of Democratic Action of Bosnia-Herzegovina; and other members of the delegation—has already been in the headquarters of the French battalion in Coralici [near Bihac] for three days in protest against UNPROFOR's conduct, which has been contrary to the rules on visits by civilians.

The protest by these gentlemen from the state delegation of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina also concerns UNPROFOR's attitudes toward the representatives and deputies of the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, who, after one month, and despite all guarantees from Zagreb, were not returned to the Bihac region. Several official protest notes by the legal state authorities of the Bihac region have been sent with regard to this, but they have not helped to effect the return of the deputies or the departure of the state delegation from the Bihac region.

The legal authorities of the Bihac region still insist on the opening of Coralici Airport. There is well-founded concern that a humanitarian corridor, like the commercial one, could find itself in danger. If this happened, it could be compensated for by opening Coralici Airport.

The legal state authorities have requested the opening of the airport several times, but UNPROFOR and other relevant international associations have not sent an official reply, which testifies to UNPROFOR's negative attitude toward everything that comes from the legal and official authorities of the internationally recognized state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This was stated in a communique of the Press Center of the Bihac region.

Further on Protest, Reaction

AU0411190793 Paris AFP in English 1847 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] Sarajevo, Nov 4 (AFP)—A Bosnian Government delegation is staging a sit-in at the French military base in the breakaway Bihac region, in a row with UN officials over flights to and from the area, an official confirmed Thursday [4 November].

The delegation, which flew to the Bihac pocket for talks with loyalist police and military leaders, has since Monday been occupying offices at the French battalion headquarters in Coralici, north of Bihac, Bosnian radio said.

The delegates, who include new Foreign Minister Irfan Ljubijankic, launched their protest after the UN Protection Forces failed to fly the delegation out of Bihac, the radio said.

Loyalist authorities in Bihac have written to UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali to protest, saying the delegation had been ready to leave on three occasions only for the flight to be cancelled at the last moment.

In contrast "Abdic leaves the region whenever he wants," the letter said, refering to Fikret Abdic, self-styled leader of the Bihac rebels and a food industry millionaire.

A spokesman for the French battalion, Captain Eric Hauteclocque, blamed the delay in moving both delegations on rebel Croatian Serbs, who control a strip of Croatian territory between the Bihac area and the Croatian capital.

"It is true that the Bosnian delegation has been here since Monday," he said. "But it is false to say that the UN Protection Force has refused to move them.

"There have been several attempts to fly them out... but they cannot leave because the Serbs refuse to guarantee the safety of the helicopter which was meant to fetch them," he said.

UNPROFOR had tried three times to fly the deputies into the Bihac area and take the government delegation out on the return flight, Hauteclocque added.

Abdic declared Bihac autonomous from Sarajevo in September and was dismissed from Bosnia's collective

presidency. He has since struck peace accords with Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and Bosnian Croat chief Mate Boban.

Abdic, Izetbegovic Forces Clash in Northwest

LD0411191093 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1706 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] Petrovac, November 4 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Moslem forces loyal to moderate politician Fikret Abdic and the Fifth Corps of the Bosnian Moslem Army loyal to fundamentalist leader Alija Izetbegovic on Thursday continued minor clashes in the Cazin Krajina in the north-western part of the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Moslem-controlled Bihac Radio reported.

According to the ZBIA News Agency, formed in the newly-proclaimed Moslem autonomous province of western Bosnia (APZB), the APZB military forces were advancing in the direction of the Cazin municipality.

The APZB was proclaimed late in September in the north-western part of war-ravaged Bosnia-Herzegovina where the Moslem population opposed Izetbegovic's radical and fundamentalist policy. The news agency added that the Fifth Corps command had carried out a general mobilization and prepared a new offensive on Abdic's defence lines as well as on the Bosnian Serb positions in the region.

As reported by ZBIA, a first convoy of ten trucks and four petrol tankers arrived in Velika Kladusa from Zagreb across the territory of the Bosnian Serb Republic "without any problems or escort by United Nations peacekeepers."

APZB president Abdic has recently signed declarations on lasting peace, mutual recognition and cooperation with representatives of the Bosnian Serbs and Croats.

Heavy Muslim-Croat Fighting Near Zepce Reported

LD0411222593 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Excerpt] The ferocious Muslim offensive against Zepce is in its second day. A large Muslim mujahedin unit from Zavidovici attacked HVO [Croat Defense Council] positions in the Viniste [east of Zepce] area this morning. Four elderly civilians were killed and mutilated in the attack after which heavy fighting broke out. Special HVO forces this afternoon repelled the attacks and inflicted heavy losses on the enemy in men and equipment. According to the information of the political department of the Zepce operational zone since last night the Muslim Army has been moving in columns from the direction of Zenica, Kakanj and Vares toward Zepce. [passage omitted]

Sarinic Comments on Oslo Meeting With Serbs

LD0411221093 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Interview with Hrvoje Sarinic, presidential national security adviser and delegate to Serbian-Croatian talks in Norway, by unidentified announcer in Zagreb—live]

[Text] The guest of Croatian Television's main news program this evening is Hrvoje Sarinic, head of the Office for the Protection of the Constitutional System of the Republic of Croatia and for relations with UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces], and the head of the Croatian delegation at the negotiations in Norway. Good evening.

[Sarinic] Good evening.

[Announcer] Welcome. You have just arrived from Norway. This attempt to reach a comprehensive cease-fire agreement has failed as well. Why?

[Sarinic] Well, I would rather not make such sweeping statements. It is true that the results are very meager, less than we expected and hoped for. However, although no agreement was signed....[pauses] You know that the agreement which is the condition for all further discussions and agreements is the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, on a cease-fire—that agreement was not signed, and I can tell you why.

UNPROFOR and the international conference on the former Yugoslavia offered a draft proposal which was already discussed in Geneva in July, and then improved in Vienna in September. Both in Vienna and in Geneva, military experts of the two sides almost reached an agreement on this, but the Serbian side came up with a new proposal which was unfortunately not acceptable for the Republic of Croatia. What was unacceptable is that, although the Erdut agreement [signed by Serbs and Croats in August] was not mentioned, the Serbian proposal contained elements of it. Of course, we could not accept that because the Erdut agreement cannot be taken out of the overall context. If the Erdut agreement is honored, then all Security Council resolutions passed before the Erdut agreement must be honored as well, and above all, of course, the latest, Resolution 871 of 4 October.

[Announcer] You, in your capacity as leader of our delegation at the negotiations, were in fact authorized to accept a very wide-ranging dialogue with the rebel Serbs' side, based on our well-known and clearly defined standpoints. Were there any concrete talks regarding the oil pipeline, economic issues?

[Sarinic] Yes, of course. This is what we concentrated on. I will even tell you that in the first phase we even tried to avoid those sensitive issues that are naturally of a political nature so we could reach that first cease-fire agreement and following this we could proceed by way of small-step tactics, strategy.

At this stage we have not succeeded. However, I believe that everything is open and that there will be further talks. The organizers even told us that Israel and Palestine had held 14 meetings in Norway until they reached agreement so they even said in jest, "You have another 13 meetings ahead of you".

[Announcer] President Tudjman's peace initiative was, of course, sent to the co-chairmen and their aide, Knut Vollebaek. Your interlocutors, I mean the Serbian local authorities in Croatia's UN protected area, are also familiar with it. How did they react?

[Sarinic] Listen, this was a kind of shock when they learned of it. At the very beginning I read out item seven of the President of the Republic's initiative to them. It refers precisely to these economic initiatives. They nevertheless demanded a pretext so they could take a harder approach. I believe that if it had not been for this they would have, of course, found some other pretext. I have to say that we, our entire strategy is based precisely upon the peace initiative launched by the President of Republic Franjo Tudjman and its contents.

I will tell you another thing which is, of course, impeding all these talks. In these so-called Krajinas today there are smaller and larger factions. There are more powerful personalities, there are weaker ones. And then again all this is changing daily. This is of course an obstacle as you do not have a real interlocutor and you are not sure whether the interlocutor you have just reached some agreement with will tomorrow be the one who is capable of implementing what we have agreed on.

[Announcer] Cochairman Stoltenberg denied in Stockholm today that Croatian President Tudjman was going to meet Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic in Norway. He said that a solution to the question of peace in Croatia was merely a precondition for a possible peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and that he did not see any possibility of the war in the neighboring country coming to an end until 1994. What is your view?

[Sarinic] Well, our view was and still is that Serbian-Croatian relations are the key to a solution to the problem in the area of the former Yugoslavia. Hence, what we are doing now is certainly the key to a total solution, or at least one of its important elements. Likewise, one must not forget that Belgrade and Mr. Slobodan Milosevic in particular wields a great deal of influence on these talks we are conducting. The line-up of this Serbian delegation, including Mr. Dusan Rakic, who until a month ago was the commander of the navy in Boka Kotorska and who is now the minister for defense of that so-called Krajina, and Mr. Jarcevic [foreign minister of republic of Serbian Krajina], who hails from Kupres, indicates that these people are installed there so as to pursue a certain policy from a long distance.

[Announcer] Tell us whether you are going to meet representatives of the rebel Serbs before 1994 in secret or otherwise?

[Sarinic] If something is really secret then there is nothing I can tell you about. We did however agree to continue our dialogue. The door is not closed. We believe that in the near future, within ten days or two weeks, there will be another initiative calling for fresh talks.

[Announcer] Thank you Mr. Sarinic.

RSK Plans to Indict Tudjman for 'War Crimes'

LD0511043893 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2205 GMT 4 Nov 93

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, Nov 4 (TANJUG)—The republic of Serb Krajina (R.S.K.) will shortly bring in an indictment against Croatian President Franjo Tudjman for war crimes against Serb civilians, says R.S.K. parliament speaker Mile Paspalj.

In a statement on his return from an official visit to Bulgaria on Thursday [4 November], Paspalj blamed Tudjman for the massacre of 100 people in the Serb villages of Divoselo, Pocitelj and Citluk, by the invading Croatian Army in its September 9 offensive against the Lika region in the U.N.-protected R.S.K. The Croatian crimes have been confirmed by the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and described as a planned scorched-earth operation which had had to be approved from the highest place.

Chairman of the R.S.K. Commission for Humanitarian Affairs Savo Strbac said that 10 Serbs, arrested while defending their homes in the three R.S.K. villages against the invading Croatian troops, had recently been sentenced to 15 years in prison in Karlovac, south of Zagreb in Croatia. What we had here was the criminals judging the victims, he said.

The R.S.K. was proclaimed in December of 1991 by the local Serbs in those parts within the arbitrary communist-era borders of Croatia where they are the majority population, in response to Croatia's violent secession from Yugoslavia and severe curtailing of their rights.

The Croatian Army has launched three offensives against the R.S.K.—in June of 1992 and in January and September of 1993—since the territory was placed under U.N. protection in March of 1992.

Serbs Reportedly Attack Coastal Towns

LD0511101493 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in English 0903 GMT 5 Nov 93

[Text] Last night Serbs fired three artillery shells on Biograd causing significant material damage but there are no reports of casualties. The villages of Paljuv, Islam Grcki, and Kasic were attacked with tanks, mortars, and artillery until 0300 this morning. The region has been quiet since then. During the night Serbs conducted attacks south of Karlovac with three mortars fired near Turanj and gunfire in Logoriste and (Miksici).

Appeal Issued for Aid in Accommodating Refugees

LD0411163293 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Excerpts] [Announcer] The office for refugees and displaced persons of the government of the Republic of Croatia is urgently trying to find accommodation for refugees. Jadranka Kosor spoke about this problem with the head of the office, Adalbert Rebic.

[Kosor] Mr. Rebic, the government's office for refugees and displaced persons today sent an appeal for urgent assistance for the care for Bosnian refugees in Croatia, and for their accommodation in Herzegovina. What is the most urgent issue?

[Rebic] The most urgent issue is to find accommodation for such a large number of refugees from Vares. Namely, as the public knows, the Muslim aggressor yesterday took the town of Vares, the Croatian enclave of Vares, and about 15,000 Croats who lived in Vares and the surrounding villages are now refugees. We must urgently find accommodation for them in Croatia, that is, for the refugees who cannot be sheltered in Herzegovina.

[Kosor] So, most of them will come to Croatia?

[Rebic] Yes, most of them will later gradually come to Croatia. At the moment we do not have any room for them; we have sufficient facilities for only about 3,500 to 4,000 refugees from the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina. [passage omitted]

[Kosor] Mr. Rebic, who have you appealed to for urgent help? What do you expect?

[Rebic] I personally addressed a verbal appeal for urgent assistance in the care for the refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina to the UNHCR in the Republic of Croatia, Mr. (Muchet), who promised to help and send mattresses, sheets and duvets, as well as food, family parcels. We also sent written appeals to all media, embassies and all humanitarian organizations.

[Kosor] All those who can and want to help....

[Rebic, interrupting] All those who can and want to help, will help.

[Kosor] Who should they contact?

[Rebic] They should contact our office for refugees and displaced persons in the government of the Republic of Croatia, Street of the Republic of Austria 14, Zagreb.

Commentary Condemns HVO Role in Massacre

AU0211184393 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 29 Oct 93 p 7

[Commentary by Aleksandar Milosevic: "There Is No Justification"]

[Text] Is a scandal about to break that could seriously undermine the political and moral credibility of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] and the Croat republic of Herzeg-Bosna in the eyes of the international public? What really happened in Stupni Do? Who burned the village and what happened to its Muslim residents? Answers are still being awaited, but one thing is certain—the village of Stupni Do was burned to the ground, and some of its residents, civilians, were killed. This crime has been ascribed to the military units of the HVO, although the official representatives of the Croat republic of Herzeg-Bosna have discarded this possibility in an official statement. The credibility of this statement, has, however, been questioned, due to prior claims denying that Stupni Do had been destroyed and that there were casualties there. When, after several days, the members of the UN peace forces entered the village, located near the Vitez-Breza road, it became evident that information regarding the destruction of the village and the killing of its residents had been accurate.

It is less important how this tragic event came about; whether in combat operations or as a result of the willful and irresponsible action of some of the local commanders of HVO units. The international media have given huge publicity to the destruction of the village and the killing of some of its residents, and they have made it clear that the perpetrators were Croats. Because of future relations with the international public, it is vital that the official institutions of the Croat republic of Herzeg-Bosna order an urgent and thorough investigation of this unfortunate and tragic event.

No excuses, no former mojahedin crimes against the Croatian populace and its villages can or should justify acts of revenge. Such actions can only harm the reputation of Croats, Herzeg-Bosna, and the Republic of Croatia in the world. There is no need for particularly stressing the fact that those who still cannot come to terms with Croatian sovereignty and independence, are blaming precisely the Republic of Croatia, its political institutions, and the Croatian Army for much of what is happening in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina.

It is common knowledge that Serbia's international reputation was completely destroyed when the international public was informed of the numerous crimes that the Yugoslav Army and Serbian paramilitary formations committed against the civilian population during the war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Because of their unparalleled brutality, primarily toward the civilian population, the Serbs and Serbia will be despised and marked in the eyes of the international community for a long time to come. Such actions have significantly contributed to the decision of many international institutions to exclude the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro, that is, from their membership. There is a constant danger that the international community will equate the blame and responsibility of all the warring factions in the war that is being waged on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. That is why the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina must keep in mind that no suffering of the Croatian population can be an excuse for similar actions toward civilians, regardless of their nationality.

True, war is not waged in kid gloves and with flowers, but the civilizational level of one warring side is measured precisely by its adherence to those international regulations and laws that regulate the behavior of warring sides in war.

It is a fact that Croatia did not want this war, that it was forced upon it. The same applies to Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, embarking on this war in order to protect national integrity and biological survival did not give us the right to endanger the integrity and survival of others.

Of course, the investigation still needs to shed light on what really happened in Stupni Do. However, due to the extremely delicate political moment and actions that are being undertaken in the international public, we need to act quickly, clearly, and without attempting to hide anything. We expect that the state institutions of the Croatian republic of Herzeg-Bosna will clearly and openly state whether someone—and who—from the HVO ranks is really responsible for the killing of the villagers. They most certainly did not kill themselves and set fire to their village. It can even less be expected that the killing of the residents of this Muslim village will heal Croatian wounds caused by similar actions perpetrated by the mojahedin and chetnik forces in Bosnian Posavina, central Bosnia or Herzegovina.

The HVO must prove by its treatment of the civilian population that, culturally, by its civilized nature, and in every other respect, it really is different from the others in this war. Among other things, it needs to prove that it is fighting for some universal principles of justice and human dignity; not only for the Croats, but for all those who live in these areas.

Serbia

Milosevic Orders Arrests of SRS Members

AU0511123793 Paris AFP in English 1225 GMT 5 Nov 93

[By Nicolas Miletitch]

[Text] Belgrade, Nov 5 (AFP)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic has declared war on his former extreme rightwing ally, the Radical Party [SRS] of Vojislav Seselj, arresting 18 party militants on charges of terrorism, murder and banditry ahead of snap elections next month.

The militants, all members of the party's paramilitary formations, were arrested late Thursday [4 November] in Belgrade and four provincial cities, Belgrade television reported quoting a communique from the Interior Ministry.

It is the first time that Serbian authorities have engaged in a head-on confrontation with Seselj's militia, which numbers around 2,000 armed men according to foreign experts and nearly 8,000, according to the Yugoslav military.

With early elections for the Serbian parliament called for December 20, Milosevic's Serbian Socialist Party (ex-communist) spectacularly split with Seselj after a year's coalition, which had allowed the Socialists to govern.

The Radical Party held a third of the seats in the parliament dissolved at the end of October when a power struggle broke out between the two parties.

The Socialists announced then that they intended to expose the "crimes committed against the civilian population" of Croatia and Bosnia by Seselj and his militia and denounced the Radical Party leader as "the personification of evil, violence and primitiveness."

The arrest of members of Seselj's militia is evidence of the Serbian authorities' fears of a possible violent reaction by the ultra-nationalist Radicals, who possess a formidable arsenal brought back from the battlefronts of Croatia and Bosnia, according to informed sources in Belgrade.

These first arrests could be followed by the arrest of Seselj himself, who figures high on a list of presumed war criminals drawn up in 1992 by the U.S. Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger.

By sacrificing Seselj—whose praises Milosevic was singing publicly only a few months ago—the Serbian leader may also be hoping to demonstrate to the international community his willingness to punish war criminals.

Open war with Seselj falls into the Serbian president's new policy of trying to improve his tarnished image abroad in the hopes of persuading the international community to lift the sanctions imposed a year and a half ago on rump Yugoslavia, as the situation in the country becomes increasingly intolerable.

The Radical Party remains the SPS's biggest threat in the upcoming elections, with the democratic opposition weak and disorganised. The main opposition party, the Serbian Renewal Movement led by the writer Vuk Drakovic, has already said it will boycott the elections.

Milosevic's hand is strengthened by his influence over state television, which remains the country's key source of information as newspapers are too expensive for most Serbs.

Milosevic Addresses Current Issues

AU0411100293 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 2120 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Interview with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic by Slobodan Jovanovic, director of the TANJUG agency; Dusan Zupan, chief editor, and Zivorad Minovic and Hadzi Dragan Antic from POLITIKA; Mile Kordic from EKSPRES POLITIKA; Rade Brajovic from VECERNJE NOVOSTI; Slavko Curuvija from BORBA; Dragoljub Milanovic from Belgrade Television; Momir Brkic from Belgrade Radio; Dragan Kojadinovic from NTV Studio B; and Aleksandar Tijanic from Television Politika, in Belgrade on 3 November—recorded]

[Text] [Unidentified studio announcer] Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic held talks today in Belgrade with the chief editors of the main Serbian media. This meeting was arranged on TANJUG's initiative, as it is celebrating its 50th anniversary. President Milosevic responded to the request of the chief editors to reply to the current internal and foreign political issues that are of vital interest for the citizens of Serbia.

President Milosevic held talks with Slobodan Jovanovic, director of the TANJUG agency; Dusan Zupan, chief editor, and Zivorad Minovic and Hadzi Dragan Antic from POLITIKA; Mile Kordic from EKSPRES POLITIKA; Rade Brajovic from VECERNJE NOVOSTI; Slavko Curuvija from BORBA; Dragoljub Milanovic from Belgrade Television; Momir Brkic from Belgrade Radio; Dragan Kojadinovic from NTV Studio B [Independent Television]; and Aleksandar Tijanic from Television Politika.

[Milosevic] Well, fine, I am glad to see you on such an important anniversary, 50 years of TANJUG. Please?

[Jovanovic] As you know, TANJUG is marking half a century of existence, 50 years since this national agency was formed. On this occasion, we have asked President Slobodan Milosevic for an interview. In its form, this interview might be a bit unusual. We have invited our colleagues, chief editors of all the media, all the most prominent and influential media in Belgrade, in Serbia, in Yugoslavia. They are here. I would first like to thank

President Milosevic for coming, and I would also like to thank our colleagues for taking part in this interview. We will all be equal in this. I, as the host, or somewhat of a host, will have the advantage of asking the first question.

Mr. President, this week, the most current issue is the issue of the peace conference on the former Yugoslavia. We have been informed, we have read in the press, that you have set conditions for this conference in your talks with Mr. Stoltenberg [Conference on Yugoslavia cochairman]. Could you tell us more about these conditions?

[Milosevic] Involved are two conditions. Namely, you know very well that the FRY and the Republic of Serbia have tried to make a constructive contribution to establishing peace in Yugoslavia. In principle, we think that the peace conference with a sort of global approach that is being mentioned now may be a useful road toward solving the Yugoslav crisis on the whole. However, in our opinion, and from our point of view, there are two conditions for this conference. The first one is to respect the principle of the equality of the participants, which is, after all, the basic principle of international relations. This means that if this principle is not respected, the Serbian side would not take part in such a conference. Therefore, it is implied that it would not be acceptable and, I hope, not logical either, that the Serbian side should go to the conference with sanctions and the Croatian side with privileges. So this first principle, the principle of equality, I believe should not only be understood but also respected by everyone in the international community.

The second condition is that this international conference cannot discuss our internal questions. It cannot deal with our internal questions. Every country deals with its own internal questions. Therefore, an international conference whose agenda might include proposals to solve the questions of Kosovo or, as they also add, those of Sandzak and Vojvodina and some other things is, in our view, an unacceptable approach. I think that these conditions are perfectly logical, and that they are conditions understood by all our citizens, conditions that every citizen of ours would set himself.

However, there is another thing here, which you have not asked me about, but which I would like to say. Setting a global approach at the moment when, according to the statement of Stoltenberg himself, it is only an issue of 2.7 percent of the package, is practically an excuse for the international community to avoid completing the work on the peace agreement on Bosnia, which has been 97, or whatever, percent completed. It is illogical to abandon this work when 97.5 percent—according to them—has been finalized, in order to beat about the bush now with some kind of global approach. It would be logical to first complete this job. That is why we believe that the international community should not avoid becoming directly involved in this job and exerting, if it so wants, positive pressure on those who are attempting to continue the war and avoid peace on the territory of the former Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Jovanovic] Mr. Stoltenberg said in Oslo, pardon me, in Stockholm, today that he rejected Mr. Tudjman's initiative, that it was unrealistic to hold the conference this year, and he set five conditions for holding the conference. The first one is that it should be well prepared; second, that the platform and concept are established; third, that part of it involves the lifting of the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, that is, Yugoslavia; third, [as heard] that economic aid should be given to all the former Yugoslav republics, and five, that a way is established to help Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the humanitarian sense.

How would you comment on his conditions?

[Milosevic] The essence lies in relation to a broad proposal put forth by President Tudjman, which has only one novelty in comparison to former stances of the Republic of Croatia, and that is the idea of broadening the circle of outside participants. I do not think that this is a good approach or that the Yugoslav crisis can be solved by broadening the circle of outside participants. It could be solved sooner and more efficiently by reducing the circle of outside participants. After all, the crisis would have not flared up in this way had it not been for some of the many outside participants who brought about the crisis, the war, and the escalation of the war.

[Milovanovic] Mr. President, if I may: Can you tell us what is the greatest obstacle to concluding the peace negotiations on Bosnia?

[Milosevic] The greatest obstacle is undoubtedly the position—which I would no longer call the Muslim position, since, regarding the Muslims' approach to the settlement of the Bosnia-Herzegovina problem you have seen that there are different approaches—of a section of their leadership, that is, the leadership under President Izetbegovic. They believed for many months, I would say, that they would provoke military intervention, foreign military intervention with their behavior. They needed to find a way for someone to come from outside to win the war that they had lost. Now that it is realized that there is to be no intervention, since no one is willing to wage a war for them that they have lost, they are hoping that they will soften the Serbs by prolonging and dragging things out, by exhausting Yugoslavia, on which the Serbian people in Krajina and Bosnia are relying on. They are simply trying to prolong this situation in which they could still provoke a more serious intervention, a more serious move by outside elements, who could turn things in their favor. While doing so, however—and as you know, this is not solely my opinion; it is evident that many foreign papers have been reporting on this—they are completely disregarding the position of the Muslim people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They simply do not care about the suffering of this people. They have this obsessive idea that they have to establish this state in Europe,

and they simply do not care for victims, they do not consider the price to be paid.

I hope that the processes that have been initiated—and we have seen this in the case of western Bosnia, and there are signs in many other parts of this Muslim republic that are obviously in favor of peace—will help them to a much better position, that is, a position that will enable them to overcome these war options that, I hope, will be represented by an ever-decreasing circle of extremists in the coming months. I am certain—not only in the case of the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also in the case of the Muslims and the Croats—that an overwhelming majority of Muslims, Serbs, and Croats want peace. I believe that precisely this option will prevail among the Muslim people and in the policy that they will conduct.

[Unidentifed reporter interjects] May I... [does not finish sentence].

[Milosevic] Wait your turn.

[Antic] In your opinion, what is Serbia's current position in relation to the outside world?

[Milosevic] I would say that this is a very general question. The outside world is not homogeneous. The outside world cannot be qualified as a unified entity that has a unified policy toward us. I suppose that you have in mind the international community's, the Security Council's, and the EC's policies toward us. My impression is that our position is improving day by day with the same speed with which it is being realized that Serbia and Yugoslavia, and the Serbian people in the former Yugoslavia in general, are not the factor perpetuating combat clashes, but, above all, as the recent months have demonstrated, a factor that is working toward peace.

I am certain that the arguments given for imposing the sanctions on our country are losing their credibility, even in those countries that were the fiercest advocates of imposing the sanctions, and I would venture to say, the greatest manufacturers of untruths regarding the situation in our country, and the main protagonists of those already known and admitted errors that the international community committed in the course of the entire Yugoslav crisis, starting with the abandonment of the The Hague Conference principles, to the premature recognition of first Slovenia, Croatia, and then Bosnia-Herzegovina; you remember that Carrington himself—who chaired the conference—said, as soon as he left this post, that the greatest error was actually the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina; that this was what caused the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, a whole series of these arguments that were fabricated are now crumbling according to the domino principle.

I am certain that—although a number of countries in whose interest it was to break up Yugoslavia will insist on keeping the sanctions in place in order to cripple us—they will continue to lose ground for persisting with them. The world will have to face the truth sooner or later when it comes to Yugoslavia. Of course, it would suit us better if this were sooner, but this sooner or later is not such a relative term, and it does not involve a long time. We believe that at the moment there is an increasing trend toward correcting the attitude that has been taken toward our country.

[Kordic] Many mass media in the West are predicting that the war in Krajina and Bosnia-Herzegovina will spread to Kosovo and Metohija. How realistic is the danger of that happening? How do you see the solution to the crisis, particularly in Kosovo and Metohija?

[Milosevic] This danger is not very realistic. Not because those who are predicting it do not want it to happen; they very much want it to happen. This danger is not very realistic because the extremists in Sandzak, of whom I must say there are not many, are not strong enough to do it. Similarly, the separatist movement in Kosovo is not able to do it either without substantial support from outside, about which I am doubtful, because such outside support would also be a very, very risky operation for anyone who would venture into it. They would know that we are not giving up our country. Therefore, what you said is more of a public announcement of wishes than a prediction of what will happen in Sandzak and Kosovo. I do not of course rule out the possibility of someone trying to cause an incident, even a major incident, but the chances of such moves succeeding are nonexistent.

[Brajovic] As I am from a paper that is primarily concerned with internal political issues, I would like to turn to that. Relations between Montenegro and Serbia are frequently not on a par with common wishes and commitments. The differences that appear between the ruling political parties sometimes cannot be considered usual. There are sometimes sharp differences among the deputies of these two parties, among the deputies of the parties from the two republics in the Yugoslav Assembly. There are sharp differences, as we have seen these days, within the church. The events at the border, blocks on trade, traffic, and so on, all this is cause for concern. In any case, the consequences are clear, and one of them is the spread of Montenegrin separatism.

[Milosevic] I believe that the differences between Serbia and Montenegro are exaggerated when it comes to the attitude to the common state, the FRY. I am certain that the citizens of Montenegro are as interested as the citizens of Serbia in preserving Yugoslavia. I am also certain that the Montenegrin leadership shares that view, and expresses that will of the citizens of Montenegro. There are of course a number of factors on the political scene that are working in a different direction, some of them are justified and founded long ago—you are aware of these divisions—some of them have aspirations rooted in the ideas of those who broke up Yugoslavia—which was best described in that Hague document we rejected for those very reasons, as it implied the implementation of that plan for liquidating any kind of serious and independent state in the Balkans. [sentence as heard]

Some of these factors lie in the problems that stem from this serious economic crisis. However, not to elaborate at great length on all these elements—including the latest scandal with the so-called quasi-priest [raspop] that was appointed there—these are still marginal issues from the point of view of the long-term historical interests of both the Serbian and the Montenegrin people and their common state. I am certain that, for both the citizens of Serbia and Montenegro and their leaderships, there are no significant differences when it comes to the attitude toward our common state.

[Brkic] Mr. President, I would first like to thank you on behalf of Radio Belgrade for receiving us. I would also like to thank the colleagues from TANJUG, congratulate them on their anniversary, and to inform you that the cooperation between Radio Belgrade and TANJUG is—in our opinion—extremely good, that the fact that Radio Belgrade is current, informative, in the right place at the right moment, is due to many TANJUG journalists, primarily correspondents from abroad. Now allow me ask one question; we are discussing internal relations; how do you assess present Serbian-Croatian relations, is the normalization of these relations in sight, and what are the main obstacles to a speedier normalization of these relations?

[Milosevic] First of all, the main issue, the issue of the normalization of the Serbian-Croatian relations in the Balkans is the key issue for stability in the Balkans. Relations between the Serbs and the Croats in the Balkans are, I would say, the key relations for the stability in the Balkans. Thus, in a historical sense, if I may say so, every serious Croatian politician, and every serious Serbian politician who thinks about the future of his country and his people should try to strive for the normalization of Serbian-Croatian relations.

However, there are many obstacles for this normalization and they are very great at this moment. They primarily lie in the fact that, as a consequence of the third consecutive attempt to carry out genocide on the Serbian people in Croatia, a war of fluctuating intensity is still going on there. There will be no solution unless we return to the basic principle of the equality of peoples and the right of all peoples to self-determination. Therefore, I think that the direction and path along which the settlement of these relations in practice and the current war between Krajina and Croatia should be moving is first to find an agreement on a general end to hostilities. After that, they should establish and solve, on an equal footing, some concrete problems concerning transportation, infrastructure, oil pipe lines, long distance transmission lines, energy supplies, and so forth. After that, in a state of peace, conditions would be created for discussing the main problems concerning the political settlement.

As you have seen, this process that has been starting and then withering, that had been starting and withering from the very beginning of the implementation of the Vance plan, this process was being pushed back to its initial position. This was primarily due to Croatian policy and the Croatian Army with its offensive that took place on 22 January, then in the Maslenica region and Peruca, before that on the Miljevac plateau, and recently in September in the Medak pocket, where, as had been the case in the previous offensive, they carried out a genuine massacre of civilians. It would be senseless to talk about some other approach in these circumstances, other than an approach that should first ensure the end of hostilities and then all the other conditions so as to arrive at a position in which one could talk about a final political solution. This is why we have supported the negotiations between Knin and Zagreb from the very beginning. You will remember that several months ago in Geneva, Tudjman and I jointly supported the agreed Erdut Agreement, which specified that the Croatian forces should withdraw from the territory in the vicinity of Maslenica, the Miljevac Plateau, and the Peruca dam, that the Serbian police should enter Islam Grcki, Kasici, and Smokovic in the western part, and that normal traffic be established for the Croatian side over the Maslenica Bridge, because it connects the central part of Croatia with Dalmatia, and that they should not be forced to remain in this position where Dalmatia is like an island.

However, although both Tudjman and I supported this agreement, although the Serbs implemented this agreement entirely, the Croatian side did not implement it. Simply, after several days of procrastinating with the implementation, they announced that it was no longer valid. Therefore, they have to go back to this type of agreement, and after that, they have to make sure that these agreements are observed. Only then will they achieve an atmosphere in which they can discuss further steps. Before that, it is very difficult to say more about this.

[Tijanic] Mister President, it is nice to be able to meet on this jubilee as, otherwise, we from smaller television stations would not have the opportunity to personally ask you some questions. My question to you would be: Would you assess the relations between yourself and General Tudjman to be better than the political relations of Serbia and Croatia are, that is to say, to what extent can Mr. Tudjman be trusted in the talks?

[Milosevic] Well, I could not separate the relations between Serbia and Croatia and the relations between President Tudjman and myself. In numerous talks that we had, I gained an impression that he is also interested and determined to finally start resolving these issues in peace. Also, you have seen that, regarding our engagement in the resolution of the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis, we have reached, I would say, not to use this word, almost full concord on this plan that, as you know, the Serbian and Croatian sides have accepted.

At this moment, I cannot assess how much everything that has changed in the political structure of Croatia has strengthened this option with President Tudjman, namely, to resolve the existing problem primarily

between Krajina and Croatia, and how much the military option is still topical. The military option would be a fatal and tragic mistake, which has been proved by the few recent offensives that have shown that each of them had made peace more distant and returned the process to the initial stage.

I would like to believe that Tudjman, as a realistic politician, is determined to resolve this in a peaceful manner. If this determination is confirmed by the behavior of the Croatian side, then our side will strive to use all our influence over the Krajina leadership to embrace peace negotiations and a peaceful resolution. If we, again, speak of trust that can be betrayed in a way it was betrayed at the beginning of January or in September 1993, then we will face the same problems again and return to the very beginning. In any case, I wish to believe that a determination for peace exists, until events prove the contrary.

[Tijanic] Thank you, Mr. President.

[Curuvija] During these six years of your term of office, BORBA now has the opportunity to ask you a question directly for the first time. Thank you for this possibility. I personally believe that you would help the Serbian citizens very much in overcoming this dramatic crisis in which they are and the increasingly dangerous international isolation, if you did three things: Give the opposition the mandate to form the government, irrespective of the electoral results; suggest the Serbs in Croatia that they find a stately form of coexistence with Croatia; and prosecute all those Serbian citizens who, during the war years, committed crimes in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Are you willing to do this?

[Milosevic] Naturally, I am not. I am not, on the grounds of principles. How can you, at all, say that a political decision should be made irrespective of the electoral results, I beg you? Do you think that the citizens of Serbia wonder or not, express their will or not, or, as you suggest, we must do what foreign countries tell us to do regardless of their will? You must realize one thing, namely, that this people will never accept slavery. These people want to elect their authorities themselves and not have foreign countries elect them for them. Regardless of what these authorities are, the people will elect them and the people will change them. It will not be the Germans, the English, the Americans, or anyone else, that will elect their authorities.

These people simply do not have a master in Europe, as opposed to some other nations of former Yugoslavia, and have never tolerated one. Even when these people had masters temporarily, they did everything possible to see the back of them and, by God, none of them lasted. I am sure that there can be no talk of passing such key decisions regardless of the will of the Serbian citizens.

I must tell you that I am sometimes worried when major decisions depend on politicians. However, when major decisions depend on citizens I sleep soundly, because I am sure that the citizens do not make mistakes, regardless of certain uncertainties, pressures, and persuasions, they do not make mistakes.

Regarding the other question referring to a mode of coexistence, well, we have just spoken about it. The peace process and an agreement must be embraced. We all live in the Balkans, and so will our children and our grandchildren. We must do everything so that there would be no more war here. However, it must be clear to everyone that there can be no agreement on unequal terms, and there can be no peace by force. Peace can take place through mutual consensus and protection of the interests on both sides.

Regarding the criminal responsibility of the Serbian citizens who have perpetrated criminal acts, this is a part of our firmly determined policy, and there is no reason to discuss this at all. It goes without doubt that, speaking of the Serbian citizens who have perpetrated criminal acts, sooner or later, depending on the evidence that will be available to the prosecution organs, they will have to give account for it. This is truly not contestable.

[Kojadinovic] Mr. President, I thank you that Studio B, as a representative of the alternative media, so to speak, is also taking part in this interview. It is the first time for us, too, and I hope that it will become a new practice.

Naturally, in light of what you have been saying, numerous questions arise. I believe that a great majority of the people, on all three sides, are already saturated with war, that everybody has had enough of war. Numerous people legitimately wonder to what extend the peace is in the hands of any of the warring sides or the leaders of those warring sides. This, therefore, gives rise to a question of international factors and the global interests of the superpowers. Several opinions that are very debatable and perhaps more topical than some others exist on this. For example, in the talks with some officials at my level, I have manage to sense that no type of Muslim state in Europe and in the Balkans would suit the West. We have often witnessed that everybody was saying how we were only a step away from peace, while threats were coming from all sides and, instead of peace, the clashes actually escalated. Naturally these threats were always aimed against the Serbs.

Therefore, to what extent is peace in the hands of the three warring sides, how much is it dependent on the will of the peoples and the leaders of the warring peoples, and how great and crucial is the influence of the West, because it is obvious that the crisis zone in Bosnia is primarily a potential encouragement for all other possible crisis zones that numerous people in this country do not wish at all? Therefore, the fear continues to be as equally great as the desire to restore peace as soon as possible. To ask another question, to what extent are the people who are coming to see you the envoys of peace, or are they perhaps also the envoys of unrest?

[Milosevic] As regards the other question about the extent to which peace is in the hands of the three sides,

the key answer is that there will be peace to the extent to which it is in the hands of the three sides. There will be no peace if it is in the hands of the three sides. There will be no peace if it is in the hands of people abroad. I am going to try to explain that very simply: The powers who wanted to break up Yugoslavia and who caused its breakup, who committed a crime against a UN member-country, violating all norms of international law, have the same aims today as they had at the time that they began the disintegration of Yugoslavia with all these moves of theirs, some of which I listed at the beginning.

This aim is to created a large number of small countries in the Balkans, which will have puppet governments formed under the influence of foreign factors, so that these powers may freely use the region of the Balkans which has huge significance for the development of the European economy, and therefore, great political significance as well.

We are practically the only land bridge between two continents. The most important communications routes run through this territory. It has great energy potential. Just take the example of the Danube; billions of German marks have been invested in the Rhine-Maine-North Sea-Danube canal, but what does it all mean without control over the main and most important section of this communication, of over 500 kilometers running through our country? Not to speak of the Morava-Vardar valley and communications routes over which kingdoms have warred for centuries for the same interests for which the Balkans continues to be very attractive.

Therefore, these forces do not want a single independent and autonomous country here, that is its own master and a serious military and political factor in the Balkans. And we are the greatest military and political factor in the Balkans. Therefore, this concept of breaking Yugoslavia into several statelets that will be ruled by some puppet governments was established at the very beginning and is still in force.

For those who could read, this option was clearly contained in [former Conference on Yugoslavia Chairman Lord] Carrington's document and that is why I rejected that plan. Just remember, first the six states and then the partitioning of Serbia—Kosovo, Sandzak, Vojvodina, and so forth. Therefore, the partitioning of Yugoslavia into tiny bits that could then be manipulated. What does this mean? From the standpoint of the historic interests of the Serbian nation, this means a total massacre and disintegration into so many countries that it will never be able to unite again. Therefore, here our interests are colliding with the interests of those who wanted to break up our country, disintegrate Yugoslavia, and who, even nowadays, work on the same scenario they have worked on since the very beginning.

Therefore, we have brought the peace process in Bosnia to an end. With great efforts, but successfully, we have defined in this peace package that sanctions must be eased simultaneously, that means, the UN Security Council, simultaneously with acknowledging the peace agreement on Bosnia, should pass a decision on lifting the sanctions parallel to the implementation of the peace agreement.

Speaking of the military paper, we know that the implementation is going very quickly. Therefore, the process of the lifting of the sanctions according to this agreement should have gone very quickly, but, of course, this does not suit the forces I am talking about. That is precisely why pressures, messages, and suggestions have been made to the Muslim side to wait longer. However, they became caught in a political trap that they will not be able to explain. They must now show, in front of the entire world, that they care more about the sanctions against Yugoslavia than the peace in Bosnia. This hypocrisy must be made clear to the world now. All their concern for peace in Bosnia has simply been a backdrop to continue with pressures upon our country. Just as they have had completely wrong assessments since the beginning of this crisis, they now also have wrong expectations that we will, due to the pressures and economic difficulties in which we have found ourselves, sell our state and national interests and leave it to the muddy Morava River to wash away.

Therefore I will return to the beginning of my answer, peace will be established very soon to the extent to which the issue of peace is really in the hands of the three sides and in the interest of the peoples of the three sides. peace will be established very soon. The more that peace is in the hands of the foreign element or the exponents of the foreign elements in the three sides, it will be harder to reach. I am an optimist in that respect, I am convinced that peace can be reached in Bosnia much faster than is now expected, but we will see. Time will tell.

[Jovanovic] Since we are talking about the sanctions, they are unfortunately our reality—anticivilizational, antihuman, and deeply unjust but still our reality. We think about them, we talk about them, we listen to talk about them, we live with them, but some questions still remain. For example, what are the conditions for the sanctions to be lifted? What are the real conditions for the lifting of the sanctions? Are there any new factors there? How do you see the package of these conditions for the lifting of the sanctions? Connected with that, would you dare predict when the sanctions will be lifted? How do you see the development of this country that has been, I would say, looted by the sanctions, after the sanctions?

[Milosevic] The real condition for the sanctions to be lifted—as regards the position of those who were the first and real protagonists of their imposition—is that we persevere in the defense of our state and national policy; they are living under the illusion that they are going to break up this nation with the sanctions and that, because of the sanctions, this nation is going to leave their state to the mercy of foreign factors, and as long as they think this, they will try to prolong the sanctions. This peace

agreement should remove the sanctions. All the important political factors that have been communicating with us on behalf of the international community have given us assurances to that effect.

However, what is written on paper is one thing, and what the real aim is, is another. We have just exchanged a few words about that. It must become clear that we have no alternative to this policy of preserving our state and national interests, regardless of the pressure to which we are exposed, and regardless of the continued exertion of the pressure. Since they can see that they cannot break up this solidarity just like that, that is why they are attempting to create some internal confusion.

Why are we in a difficult economic situation? They now constantly stress the social problems. Why are there queues? Why is there poverty? All of you, I suppose, have families. All of you should ask yourselves: What would happen if, for example, you take in to support two more families when, for example [word indistinct]? Can the wife and children ask tomorrow: Why cannot we go on holiday, why cannot we buy new shoes, and so on, under these circumstances? The same applies to the country. Our entire people and citizens of Serbia in general have decided on solidarity with the Serbian people on the other side of the Drina. We have the difficulties simply because of that and have the sanctions on top of that. Plus, we have refugees from those two countries, from the republic of Serbian Krajina and the republic of Srpska, that is, from the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Therefore, you as the people dealing with the public word must not allow a constant replacement of theses. [sentence as heard] Involved here are state and national interests we are talking about, not an issue of this or that move of economic policy, which can be criticized as much as you like. There are many such wrong economic moves, but that is marginal when it comes to the main issue, the situation that we are in. However, everyone has to go back to the main issue: Will we abandon our state and national interests and place them in the hands of the foreign factor in order to avoid this situation? Do the people want to accept such a price for abandoning their state and national interests? I am convinced that nobody wants this—even today, despite the fact that it is difficult and that there is a crisis—and particularly so when it is clear that these aims have made real, real progress in their realization.

After all, no one will ever be able to abolish the republic of Srpska, irrespective of whether the negotiations are returned to the beginning or of various empty games by various political factors from Europe and the world. Not to mention all the other things that come with this. Therefore, we must not allow stances to be substituted and to be sold a pig in a poke; every citizen is clear on this point, and it should be clear to all the media people.

[Milanovic] Without Serbia's internal stability, the people would certainly not withstand the sanctions and such pressures. What, in your opinion, has a decisive significance in maintaining this internal stability?

[Milosevic] I believe that, when talking about our economic potential, we are now at a level at which we can stabilize very quickly, halt further deterioration, stabilize the economy, and even start initiating certain positive trends, because the time of that first organizing and reorganizing due to such pressures and sanctions, has passed. Conditions are being created for doing many things much better. However, this economic corps, this economic segment, is extremely sensitive and has to be elaborated separately [sentence as heard]. That is why I wish to briefly say that our economic conditions and our economic potential allow—when supported by clever moves of both the federal and the republican governments—a normalization and stabilization.

The sanctions have abolished our incompetent leaderships and incompetent managers; all this has been erased by the fact that everyone has gained the right to say: It's the sanctions; just take a look at public transportation in Belgrade, what an embarrassment; what does it resemble? what does this have to do with the sanctions?; trams and trolleys do not need fuel to be able to run; it just so happens that I know that the republic has secured all of the diesel fuel for public transportation; the ones that come in a group of ten, all at once, and then they are nowhere to be seen for the next couple of hours, they too, use fuel, I suppose [sentence as heard]. This is an embarrassment, and it is quite obvious that this is extreme incompetence on the part of those authorities whose duty it is to deal with this. Therefore, there must be a lot more responsibility for the duties carried out by people on all levels. It is truly shameful that someone should justify the humiliation that the Belgrade citizens are exposed to with the sanctions imposed on our country. And so forth. Therefore, let us put this segment aside; a lot can be done on it and a lot of explaining can be done.

The other segment—the political one—is important. What is the condition for stability? The condition for stability is that Serbia must show, among other things, at these coming elections, that it is not vacillating as regards the policy of protecting its state and national interests. This is the best way to deter outside pressures and the aspirations on which these pressures are based.

[Antic] Mr. President, you have mentioned the unfavorable economic situation that, understandably, results in crime. I have the impression that the action aimed at fighting crime—which is taking on increasing proportions—has faltered somewhat, precisely because of the situation. What do you think, and what is the Serbian state going to undertake in fighting open crime and looting in society?

[Milosevic] First of all, this action must not falter, it must gain momentum. However, it calls for a better establishment of certain things in the state, several factors in the state. At the moment, we are having

extreme problems with the entire criminal legislature; had we been lucky, we would have had a much clearer criminal legislation that would have been much more coordinated with the criminal legislations of European countries that everyone looks to, and claims are examples to be followed. The situation here is, so that we can see and face the facts, that the police arrests a criminal who shot a citizen or a policeman for example, on one day, only to arrest him again three days later, because, owing to such regulations, or weaknesses in the judiciary, he was free again. Order has to be imposed in many such things, just as it has to be imposed on another, I would say, just as important segment of the issue regarding the looting of property owned by society that has been created by generation upon generation of workers in our country. Looting that is being carried out in an almost semi-legal fashion through the so-called purchase of companies. Some people call this privatization, but this is not privatization, it is looting; privatization is when you pay for that which you are turning into private property; it is not privatization when you do not pay for it. However, among other things, it is good that we are going to have elections and, I hope, a stable assembly and stable government. Experience has shown that, when the government proposed to stop this [the privatization process] for the duration of the sanctions and the current chaos, and when it proposed to pass a law, it could not pass in the Assembly, because none of the opposition parties were willing to vote for it. Neither the Radicals, nor the Democratic Movement of Serbia [Depos], nor any of those others whoever they may be. It simply could not pass. Such things, putting a stop to the looting, must be solved both institutionally—in a democratic manner, of course, through the parliament's decisions, which means passing laws that regulate this—but also through the appropriate activities of the authorities and the police. You can rest assured that as far as this action, fighting crime, is concerned, it has not faltered, and it will most certainly be intensified. We want present and future generations to live in a free and safe country; we do not want people, citizens, even children to be exposed to violence and any type of humiliation. Therefore, the state will—despite the war, the circumstance, the enormous number of refugees, the grave economic situation that lawfully gives rise to crime, and many other social-economic and other elements—have to fulfill its role, successfully and without any wavering, I hope.

[Antic] Thank you.

[Kordic] Mr. President, there has recently been much talk about humanitarian corridors for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Serbia and Yugoslavia have offered corridors from Belgrade to Sarajevo and from Bar to Sarajevo. But, as one TANJUG correspondent said, Europe is avoiding that, as it thinks that it would mean the back-door recognition of greater Serbia. Why is Europe so afraid of great Serbia when there is Great Britain and great Germany, and other great countries? What, in your opinion, is the role of the Vatican in all this?

[Milosevic] I hope that I explained a while ago that it is not a question of Europe being afraid of greater Serbia in the sense that the greater Serbia will attack someone. I would not qualify that Europe as unified in its approach toward Serbia and Yugoslavia. Europe consists of Greece and Great Britain, but also Germany, and, in a way, Turkey. Therefore this is a question of strategic interests, not of Europe, but of those powers that wanted to control this region and use it as they please, the powers that came up with that Carrington plan to break up Yugoslavia into bits and pieces, and then break up Serbia in the next phase in order to establish, through various puppet authorities, a situation in which there would be no serious, independent, free, and militarily significant state in this region. That is the reason, and not because they are afraid that we will attack them. They know that this nation has never waged a war of conquest. It has always fought defensive wars. But they also know that, in all these defensive wars, this nation has always emerged victorious.

Therefore, from your question, it is clear that the humanitarian dimension is not primary here, but rather the political one. When they think about it, they think more about the political dimension than about those about whom they are supposedly concerned, for those who have no medicine, no food, who allegedly need help. After all, please, does anybody have the right—I would say that the politicians who imposed sanctions on this country, who imposed sanctions that represent an act of genocide against this nation, who wage war against our children, against 3 million children in the FRY—they have lost every moral right to speak of humanitarian reasons, of humanitarian projects. Interests and politics are on the stage here, not humanitarian reasons. This minor example of an offer of a safe corridor that is being discussed as if it is something that might explode in their hands if they touch it, this example shows that best.

[Brajovic] In the attempts to prove that the conditions at the coming elections will be unequal, the opposition party leaders and some analysts, some colleagues, are using the element of your personality, your charisma, your influence with the voters, and your function in your party that, as head of state, you have put on ice, and so on. Other elements are also used, for example, unequal conditions in using the state television, and so on. What is this all about? Will the conditions be equal for all, and will this be a democratic match?

[Milosevic] Well, believe me I think that this question is redundant. Equal conditions absolutely must be ensured in the presentation of all the parties that will participate in the elections. I simply do not see the way—after all, you have all these television stations, Television Serbia, Politika, Studio B....[pauses] I hope that they will have the same approach to the elections. It would be not only rude, but dirty if an equal amount of time was not provided for all the parties to present themselves in an adequate way.

Now that you have mentioned the activities of the parties, we are in an economic crisis, I even think it would be indecent if the parties were to spend a lot of money on the presentation of video spots and advertisements, and to scrounge from various companies, regardless of whether they are state or private companies. If they have extra resources, I would suggest—and I will say it on this occasion—that they give it to the social funds, for medicine, for the refugees, instead of again inundating us with all that bad taste that can be crammed into those advertising spots.

If everybody does the same, everybody will have equal conditions, and they can use the time equally, I am committed to that and I believe that the government will do so, and the state television, they will make sure that everyone gets the same amount of time. Then, within that time, they can say whatever they want on the behalf of their party, their programs, they can address their voters and give them the explanations that they think are needed. I think that, under the conditions of the economic crisis, these political parties should behave in a more modest, more rational way, and not throw away money on massive advertising and campaigning. This can all be done if they all agree on an equal treatment, which I am sure will be completely indiscriminate, on the state television.

[Unidentified journalist] Mr. President....

[Milosevic, interrupting] Pardon.

[Brajovic] Your role as the head of state and the influence on the mood of the voters, which is often used as an element....

[Milosevic, interrupting] In what sense? Do you think that I should go to agitate....

[Brajovic, interrupting] As an element of the automatic advantage of the ruling party?

[Milosevic] Well, I am a member of the Socialist Party. I cannot say that I am not. I am. I am stating facts.

[Antic] But you cannot head the candidates list, as you tried to wrongly interpret.

[Milosevic] This is my political right. I hope that this question has completely been removed from the agenda, considering that there is a constitutional provision, according to which the president of the republic does not have the right to perform other public functions. For that reason, the congress of the Socialist Party of Serbia has made a decision that the function of the president of the party be performed by the general secretary of the party. Therefore, the function of the president of the Socialist Party is performed by the general secretary.

However, this does not rescind my political right as a member of the Socialist Party of Serbia and its president.

[Unidentified correspondent] Mr. President....

[Milosevic, interrupting] I am not being careful enough, because I am too much of a parliamentarian, which is my fault.

[Brkic] Mr. President, can we return to some topical economic issues that the outcome of the December elections and our future depend on to a great extent. One of these issues is the financial-monetary policy. Who is, in fact, in charge of the financial-monetary policy in Serbia at the moment? The impression is that the policy has left the government's institutions and is in the streets. The national currency is being rapidly debased. The German mark has become a measure of value. What is being done to stop this process, to bring this policy back to the government's and other relevant institutions?

And just one more related question. Criticism is heard that the funds from the primary issue of money are not being used sufficiently to finance production projects, and are used more for financial manipulations and transactions.

[Milosevic] One would need much time to explain this issue, but you did hit the most painful point of our economy. This point is called monetary system and monetary policy.

We had several handicaps. Two weeks after he had been appointed, the governor [of the national bank] fell ill and was hospitalized. This put a stop to a job that had been started. But this aside, one must simply introduced some order in the entire monetary sphere by consistently implementing the law on the national bank, by eliminating all places for issuing money, unauthorized places for issuing money, of which there are many, except the issuing central bank. You saw that we pursued the concept, according to which the republics would not have national banks. There would be one National Bank of Yugoslavia that would be in charge of issuing money and act a monetary authority.

This monetary authority should start performing its duties. As far as I know, the most responsible people from the republican and the federal governments, the current acting governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, that is the deputy governor, and the board of governors are in fact working on this. I hope that, in the next few weeks, they will be able to finally devise a method of work of the monetary authorities as a whole, and at the same time put together this fairly simple model of a foreign currency market; a unified foreign currency market in the National Bank of Yugoslavia, which will abolish this nonsense of having such a great discrepancy between the so-called official rate of exchange and the black market exchange rate, make it possible for the transactions on this unified foreign currency market, and, on the basis of these transactions, establish a rate of exchange that should fluctuate and absolutely push the black market to the margins.

The chaos, the 95 percent of the transactions that are causing the chaos pass through the banks. Only 5 percent of these transactions are made out on the streets. Once

the chaos that is created in the banks is impaired by the efficient work of the monetary authorities, the situation facilitating the black market for foreign currency will marginalize itself and become unimportant.

This would then indeed become a job for the police. However, this institutionalized work of the monetary authorities cannot be solved by the police regardless of how efficient they were in dealing with such activities on the streets. These activities are growing like mushrooms, not by themselves, but just because of the problems in the functioning and a lack of efficiency of the monetary authorities in the central bank, which I hope will finally stand on its legs and start functioning. The republican, both republican governments and the federal government, as well, as I mentioned, as the board of governors, are making efforts in this direction.

The handicaps that appear quite marginal—I know,of course, that not much can depend on individuals—were the factor that postponed the settlement of some issues, for several issues. This is very significant in these conditions. Sometimes several weeks, even several days, is a very long time in such conditions.

I hope that they will succeed, because the concept that they drafted is contained in the Law on the National Bank of Yugoslavia. This concept is well proven by competent, expert people and I think that this concept can establish a usable system, within all the constraints. This cannot eliminate inflation completely, of course. This cannot stop this grave economic situation, but can introduce much more order and slow down the negative trends in this sphere. This is certain.

[Tijanic] Mr. President, you are at the head of a state in which the middle class has been killed.

[Milosevic] I did not understand you. Killed? Who has killed what?

[Tijanic] The middle class.

[Milosevic] Yes.

[Tijanic] I would like to find out from you the reasons for the extinction of the middle class, bearing in mind that I consider the following question to be valid: Can Serbia create a democratic and civil society without honest and industrious physicians, lecturers, teachers, and clerks who can no longer provide for their families, while simultaneously an ideal role model of personality is being created and propagated everywhere, which looks boastful, rich, and armed. Good hosts, teachers, physicians, and lecturers, are no longer the ideals for our children, but rather the other ideal role models. What shall we do to preserve the class of burghers as the basis for tomorrow's Serbia?

[Milosevic] For our country to function, and for all of you, and others who are not present here right now, to truly help this country to function in the best possible way, everybody in Serbia must take a little portion of burden and responsibility on his shoulders in order to contribute toward the functioning of his country and his state.

I can assure you that such role models will not be typical for long. Once this state starts to function normally in the circumstances in which other countries and more lucky societies live, these role models will no longer pass, but precisely the models that you have singled out and which were an ideal to my generation, numerous generations before mine, and, I hope, will also be an ideal to numerous generations after me.

A role model of a criminal cannot be formed as a model personality toward which any sort of sound personality would aspire, regardless of the difficult situation in which this country has found itself. However, this involves everyone striving to fulfill his share of responsibility in this respect, even with the smallest contributions.

[Curuvija] Your disbandment of the Serbian Assembly was a subject of debates and criticism, primarily, by the opposition. However, even your biggest and most merciless critics abroad have admitted that this was a masterful move. I agree with them, however, I am nevertheless interested in why you did not allow the debate on confidence in the government to end? Secondly, in the explanation that you gave for television, you expressed hope that the Serbian citizens and the Serbian people will have a more united assembly. How should this united assembly look and how can we achieve it?

[Milosevic] Do not push me into electoral agitation, as I do not wish to be biased, however, it is certain that in the coming elections, the citizens are going to meet the challenge that these difficult times are imposing on them. They must express their orientation at the elections as well, and I believe that this orientation is to oppose fascism, violence and crime, so they are not, I am sure, going to support the advocates of darkness, fascism, violence, and crime. I am sure that, precisely for the sake of the present and future generations, they will turn to those options that will safeguard the policy defending state and national interests of this country, freedom, and the development of democracy in this country.

I think that this is the fundamental task that the citizens are faced with before the elections and I do not doubt that the Serbian citizens are mature enough to meet this task and this challenge.

[Curuvija] Excuse me, but the first part of the question was why you, nevertheless, did not allow the debate about the confidence in the government to be concluded?

[Milosevic] One could not have anticipated at all when this debate would be concluded. The previous two weeks of torture of the Assembly and the Serbian citizens had promised nothing of the kind. Also, I truly cannot recreate for you the extent to which the atmosphere that

has accompanied all this was sharper in its qualifications than the qualifications that I have used. I strived to use polite wording about the situation that had emerged in the Assembly. As you could have seen, the citizens supported this. At the end of the day, they are the best judge, and it makes no sense to toy with mental speculations as to what would have happened if something had happened. It has evidently won the support of the citizens and I am sure that speculations along the lines as to what would have happened had something else taken place is pointless.

[Kojadinovic] Your decision concerning the elections is naturally enigmatic in numerous aspects. However, I will only single out one: Numerous people expected, and others wished that perhaps on this occasion you would take a stance and use these elections as president of everybody in Serbia, that is, use them to distance yourself from the party that has nurtured you. Many people believe that you have repaid any moral debt of yours toward this party, if one can speak of this at all, in the previous elections. We now realize that you perhaps do not think so and that you will not act like this. We would like to know how you would assess the chances of the Socialist Party of Serbia if you were to opt for the variant of being the president of everybody in Serbia.

Second, the long-announced demand of some opposition parties, primarily Depos, which you have either received today, or it has been dispatched to you today, that, in order to make the elections as honest as possible, a breakthrough should be allowed to certain alternative media, primarily electronic, throughout Serbia. One demand refers to the duration on state television while the other primarily speaks about the territorial coverage of information and electoral programs. Studio B and Television Politika are primarily mentioned. Many of those who decide on this often imply that you are the one who makes the decisions regarding this, so we would like to know what the mood is, since Studio B has nothing against being broadcast throughout Serbia, even if this means that Television Politika will also be broadcast [throughout Serbia].

Technically this is very simple and much more natural. For example, why should we in Studio B negotiate with satellite companies to broadcast via satellite—which, besides being unnatural is also very expensive—to reach our potential viewers in some parts of Serbia where Studio B cannot be seen right now. Our intention is to monitor these elections honestly, therefore, to introduce the candidates from both sides, the position and the opposition.

Here I would also add that precisely Studio B is encountering a big practical difficulty when it comes to being the host of the representatives of the Socialist Party of Serbia on Studio B; they are very reluctant when deciding to come to us, and that is precisely why Studio B, which truly wishes to be independent and is independent, is gaining the epithet of being an opposition television. Some of the people whom we have invited, but who never came, claim that without your approval they are not allowed to do so; that there are very few people who could come without your approval. I do not believe that this is the case; I think that they are avoiding Studio B for reasons of their own. Therefore, I would like to know whether there is at least a hypothetical chance, that is to say, are you at all thinking of meeting this demand of the opposition, not so much a demand as a possibility for ensuring that these elections are quality elections, not to say honest?

[Milosevic] As regards the first part of your question, I have been in this post for quite some time now, and I beiieve that nobody can find any reason to remark that I have given any advantage to anybody or that I have not behaved as the president of all the citizens of Serbia in my every gesture, regardless of whether we are discussing those that voted for me, or the others who did not. With my election, I became the president of all the citizens, by majority vote and the will of the voters, and I consider it my moral obligation to behave as such, and I am convinced that I do. There is nowhere in the world, in the democracies which I suppose are an example to Studio B, not a single politician, president of the republic, or prime minister, who does not head or represent a political party which participates in political life. I do not see why Serbia should be any different from the rest of the world in this respect.

As for the fact that I am asked to grant permission—you yourself laughed at this—for someone to appear on Studio B, it is absolutely senseless that I even comment on this. As for people's reluctance to appear on Studio B, if I were in your place of director or editor-in-chief of Studio B, I would think about why people are reluctant. Moreover, when you mentioned that you are considered to be an opposition station, I believe that they not only consider you to be an opposition station, there are much worse qualifications, but, if I were in your shoes, I would also think about why the citizens think this when they watch a program for which it is evident from a great distance what the political orientation is in many of these cases on your television [sentence as heard]. However, this is something that you and your viewers should consider, not something that I.... [pauses] By following your question, I can really only casually comment on this. [sentence as heard]

I did not receive, I do not know which of the opposition's demands you are talking about; I read several days ago that the opposition demanded—actually, not the opposition, but Depos, there are a lot of opposition parties—to enjoy equal conditions and so forth. If you say that I am the one to decide whether parties at elections will have equal conditions, if I can say so, then I appeal to those who make such decision to ensure that political parties are treated completely equally on state television, radio, and other media. I also appeal to you in Studio B and in TV Politika to try to apply the same scheme, so that you are not in a position to be accused of discriminating between parties or individuals appearing on television. As for whether you are going to use someone's

network, please leave me out of this, that is, above this if possible, I really do not know what this is all about, but there are authorities on television, in the Information and Communications Ministry, who can make decisions regarding this. One thing is certain; parties will be treated equally in all the media over which the state has influence. There can be no discussions regarding this.

[Unidentified reporter] The editor-in-chief says that if they pay, then there can be discussions.

[Milosevic] Okay, you can explain this among yourselves on some other occasion.

[Zupan] Can I ask something from the second row?

[Milosevic] Well, since you are from TANJUG. [laughs]

[Zupan] Mr. President, I would like to thank you—Slobodan [Jovanovic, director of TANJUG] has probably already done so—for finding the time to receive us on the occasion of our anniversary, and I would also like—and I believe that I speak in the name of all my colleagues—to hail the idea that you have actually used this anniversary to summon all the representatives of the Belgrade media to come here for this interview. For me, this means that—maybe you share my opinion—TANJUG has a kind of ecumenical role, so to speak, in our information system. We wish to retain this role of being a service for all our press, and more than that, a service for the state and economy. Here is a question connected to this: How do you see the place and role of the media—we have touched upon this topic—in the electoral process; however, I would like to broaden the question to include how you view the role of our media in the development of democracy in our country?

[Milosevic] The question is much too exhaustive for a very exhaustive answer. There can be no doubt that the role of the media is of paramount importance in the development of democratic relations. Everyone who is involved with the media knows this, and so does every citizen. In our concrete situation, I, unfortunately, if you allow me, and we are all here together, would not be able to give a very high grade to the role of the media in principle.

When it comes to the Yugoslav crisis, the media—particularly in some western and overseas countries—have been used in a real, dirty, well-paid, and well-organized media war against our country. I believe that this will remain marked in the history of journalism as both a moral and professional lapse of your profession, because a part of the responsibility in the crime against a country which did not, and does not want anything else other than to solve its own by itself, without having someone interfere, and that its citizens can have the right to govern their state precisely to the extent of citizens of those countries whose media have satanized Serbia [sentence as heard].

As for our media, I have to say that in this case too, I would not be able to award a flattering and high grade, because my impression is—regardless of how unilateral this is, but I do not have the possibility to elaborate on many things which could be said about the media on this occasion—that the media in our country have played quite an extensive warmongering role, not uniformly, and not all of them, but that, with certain oscillations, in many cases the effect has been the same. They not only played a warmongering role, but one that was a generally unprincipled confrontation, and I believe, one that was overly receptive to outside influence in its behavior, regardless of whether it was motivated by direct political, financial, or some other motive. However, this should not tarnish the reputation and responsibility of the journalists' profession, which, I am convinced, the majority of journalists have defended with honor in these troubled times. Moreover, I hope that this shadow looming over the media, will, in this respect, which I have tried to describe in a few words, disappear with the shadows and phantoms of war from these territories, and that the media will increasingly contribute to the development of democratic relations in our country. Who is next?

[Unidentified reporter] I believe that TANJUG has exhausted its third question, so I propose that....

[Milanovic, interrupting] Respected Mr. President, how would you explain the return of the left-oriented and socialist forces on the political scene of Europe? I am particularly referring to the great election victories of the left in Poland and the Socialists in Greece?

[Milosevic] The pendulum is coming back. Things went to extremes. The anticommunist wave that has been acting destructively cannot last long. After all, you do not have anywhere in the world a genuinely democratic country in whose parliament there are no communists. Only fascist countries are banning left-oriented parties, communist parties. Simply, these are the countries that are at greatest variance with democracy, democratic values, views of the people. These countries should not be a model to anyone, the countries that are banning the left-oriented, above all, communist parties.

The wave denoting the creation of the basis for a new society is coming back. This society will certainly not be the old capitalist society nor the old socialist society. This society, I hope, will be a society based on the positive and most important values of capitalism and socialism that existed hitherto, because both societies, in their development, indebted mankind with many values, some less and some more, but in any case with values that mankind and society in development should not deprive themselves of.

I hope that this balance, which is beginning to be formed, will be established in the interest of a more rapid social development. I understand the phenomena that you spoke about as harbingers of creating such balance.

[Antic] One more question connected with the economic situation. As president of the Republic of Serbia and

head of state, what can you do specifically and quickly for the life of people to be made easier to some extent?

[Milosevic] First of all, some things would have to take place quickly. The political situation in Serbia should be stabilized and one should possess an efficient and honest state apparatus, competent in performing its functions. I hope that conditions for this will be created within a couple of months. On the other hand, if we create conditions for a competent circle of responsible people to form the government and for assembly deputies accountable before the people who voted for them to unite forces with a view to benefit the development of the republic, many of these difficulties could possibly be eliminated regardless of the fact that due to foreign pressures and difficulties this space for maneuvering has been very much narrowed down. Many things can be done in a much better, much better organized, and a much more efficient way and I hope that it is now clear to everybody that Serbia represents a motive, that Serbia, Serbia's interests, and the interests of its citizens represent a motive for uniting all these democratically oriented forces in making such changes in Serbia that would accelerate its development and make life better, happier, more democratic, and safer both for the present and future generations.

These are steps that must be taken. We must maintain our priorities. They are peace, economic development, and fighting crime. These are priorities that this state has to keep in the very center of its attention and its conduct.

[Kordic] Mr. President, this evening you also mentioned the problem of the Belgrade city transportation. We in POLITIKA EKSPRES learned about some reports that what is involved is not only idleness, incompetence, and sloppiness, but also the intention to create nervousness in Belgrade and in Serbia. What are these forces who are creating this nervousness?

[Milosevic] Well, I must tell you that I do not know the details and that I did not deal with these details. I think that all competent city authorities can organize city transportation in Belgrade. This is no great philosophy, one only has to make an effort.

If there are really some such political forces then it is a great shame that somebody is playing political games on the backs of these citizens who are suffering from this political crisis anyway by making problems in the city transportation, slowing it down, and making it less efficient. And city transportation is a vital need. If there are such forces, such phenomena and such cases, then I am sure that you all would have to make a big effort with a view to making such phenomena known to the public, so that these Belgraders would face these additional reasons for their trouble and humiliation in the city transportation.

However, let me go back to the beginning: What else are the responsible and efficient authorities in the city supposed to be capable of doing if they are incapable of organizing city transportation under the conditions in which there is no limit to the use of energy. This is a republican business, this is what the republic must provide for them. However, the republic, the Sainovic government, certainly cannot draw the time table or discipline in such an enterprise. However, if such things really exist, you, as the most responsible people in the media, should make an effort to help citizens see and learn that. Then, if there are such really shameful things that can honor nobody, one should create conditions to eliminate them.

[Brajovic] Why have, let me put it this way, the political cooks of the new world order decided to test their project exactly at this geopolitical and strategic region? Is this perhaps the result of historical heritage, the assumption of the weakness of the state that used to exist here, or is something else involved—outside interests exclusively?

[Milosevic] Well, I would say that from our point of view and from our perspective, it seems to you that they are testing that only here. Everybody exposed to some trouble thinks that it is happening to him alone. They have been testing that throughout the world. After all, your newspapers are also writing about that.

However, much more significant than this is the fact that this checking is unsuccessful in this region and I do not only hope, but I am certain that however much these people would be carrying their tests, these people here will never endure being somebody's slave. Having this fact, these other people will have to understand that further experiments are only the waste of time and money and not any road to attain aims in the territory of the former Yugoslavia populated by Serbs.

[Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian at 1531 GMT on 4 November transmits the text of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's talks with Belgrade media editors in chief, adding the following to the preceding TV report:

[[Brkic] "I would like to take the opportunity of this meeting and conversation with you to ask you a question referring to an exceptionally numerous and exceptionally important layer of our society—our farmers who feed us. Under the economic sanctions, they too are faced with many and very difficult problems. Could you tell me, how do you see our village [life] today? What is the republic doing, and what will it do to ease their life, to enable them to sow the fields and improve next year's harvest?

[[Milosevic] "The republic's priority in economic policy is agriculture. Regardless of difficulties and the politization of certain moves, one must admit that agriculture was a priority even in these years of crisis. The latest reports say that the harvest has been completed on 90 percent [of fields]. Unfortunately, your media cried wolf: There is no fuel, the fields will not be harvested.

["To be honest, that was not for the first time that I watched and listened to that. The same thing happened last spring before the spring harvest and last fall. Every

time, that group has broadcast, I would say, expressions of hopelessness claiming that we will run out of food. We have not run out of food, we have not run out of energy; we increased our production of energy, we even increased the production of coal for mass consumption, we increased the agricultural production during a season of drought. Unfortunately, in many respects farmers have found themselves in a difficult situation due to, among other things, certain mistakes in economic policy, especially in the policy on the production of milk and certain cereals. Agriculture is reflected in the production of milk because there is no milk without large [herds of] livestock, and there is no livestock without cereals—that is the basis of it all. I myself could not understand, and I intervened—I would almost say severely, which I usually do not like—in these issues which were so obvious and demanded adequate intervention.

["Let us not talk about these failures for the moment. Agriculture is one of the greatest comparative assets of our economy and it has to have priority. With such an agriculture and power industry, with such a transportation system, with a considerable number of very successful enterprises that show that we have a strong basis for modern industrial development, we can overcome these difficulties very quickly. As you can see for yourselves, despite these sanctions which are unprecedented in the history of the contemporary world, our economic situation is better than in some countries that are receiving lavish foreign aid to keep their economies afloat. Not only are they not under sanctions, on the contrary, they are in a privileged position in many ways. Let me make a digression in this direction. Therefore, as far as the economy is concerned, it will remain, and must remain, a lasting priority of every government.

[[Tijanic] "I have two questions. One is for the president of the Socialist Party, the other for the president of the republic. The first: Is the impression wrong that you have often been unlucky with, or insensitive toward, the people you are surrounded with, that some of your people at responsible posts fail to stand the test of time and difficulties?

["The second question is for the president of the Socialist Party: Who in the opposition do you think you could collaborate with in dealing with the parliament and in the implementation of policies geared toward building the Serbia we all need?

[[Milosevic] "As far as the first question goes, I can immediately give a positive reply. Yes, there have certainly been some personnel changes, very much so. This is no secret, and I also believe that it is perfectly logical for such things to happen in life.

["As for the second question, I believe that we should cooperate with all democratic forces, with all those working on the preservation of the state and national interests of our nation, the development of democracy in our country, the development of a sound market economy, national and social security, and equality. In other words, with all those turned toward the future. Certainly not with the forces of darkness, fascism, violence, and crime. The demarcation line is right there. I cannot single out political parties because I do not wish to do that. You must have noticed that I avoided specifying parties when answering your colleague's question. It would not be right for someone in my position to assess political parties.

[[Curuvija] "Some indications, in a certain way plausible, suggest that the Socialists will lose the forthcoming elections and that the opposition, if it acts wisely, will come into power. Are you ready to face a situation in which you would be president of the state in which Mihajlo Markovic from the SPO [Serbian Renewal Movement] would be the police chief, and say, Danica Draskovic the director of state television?

[[Milosevic] "Well, I think that your question is not really a question, but an indirect way of expressing your own wishes. Whether these wishes of yours are fulfilled or not—that is a matter for the citizens of Serbia to decide. Therefore, let us not—the two of us—decide on their behalf. The decision is their right, so let them decide freely.

[[Kojadinovic] "The situation is clear and very difficult for everyone. The question is not how long we will be able to hold on; the basic problem is, as many perceive it, that we are going back many years. Many people blame the Socialist Party of Serbia for that—we will not debate now whether or not they are justified in doing that—and many people are now, when we are approaching new elections, wondering what changes the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] can offer the people who are in such a difficult situation that they are often, let us say it, hungry, and who cannot ensure normal life for future generations. Could you tell us what changes could inspire many people who are perhaps not even members of the SPS to hope that a better future will be here soon? Of course, we know that the cadres are a problem. I hear very often from many people that one of your personal problems is that your associates are not good enough. We also know, at our level, that it is difficult to find good associates, which is possibly one of the general problems in Serbia, but many people would not like to see in the assembly certain faces which, they believe, do not represent well enough the people of Serbia. Therefore, are there new cadres and new promises, that is, new hopes which the SPS could offer?

[[Milosevic] "I do not wish to discuss party affairs, especially not now with the elections coming up, but I believe that you are returning to what I described as a substitution of causes. You should explain to your viewers, correctly not mistakenly, why exactly these lines are forming and why the economic situation is as difficult as it is. The people should know why. Certainly not because of the reasons you have mentioned but because of the sanctions, of course. The sanctions were imposed because we refused to allow two million of our compatriots to be slaughtered there. Therefore, do not attempt

to convince someone that this was due to some erroneous economic policies. Much bigger countries, with much more developed economies—the most developed western European countries, for instance—would certainly be much worse off under sanctions than we are.

["Therefore, the way out of this situation lies in the preservation of policies aimed at protecting our national and state interests and, under such circumstances, in the rallying of forces that are genuinely patriotic, not pseudopatriotic. Each and every one of us, in his own right, should make his contribution to this country and its unification. I hope that the upcoming political activities will make a contribution to this. It is now up to the citizens to make their decisive contribution. I also hope that they will do this regardless of whether or not this will be to the liking of someone outside or someone here whose heart is somewhere outside. I am truly optimistic in this respect and I hope that you will soon become convinced as well."]

Elections To Be Open to Foreign Observers

LD0511045793 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2200 GMT 4 Nov 93

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, November 4 (TANJUG)—It will be possible for foreign observers to monitor the early parliamentary elections in Serbia—spokesman of the republican Elections Commission Zoran Djumic said on Thursday [4 November], elaborating that this was possible under the law on the election of people's deputies. Serbian republican President Slobodan Milosevic dissolved the republican parliament on October 20 and set early elections for December 19.

No foreign observers have been announced yet, but they are expected, since more than 30 of them monitored the elections in December last year, Djumic said. The elections committee will enable foreign observers to follow the course of the elections unhindered, he said.

The leaders of several opposition parties held press conferences on Thursday about the forthcoming elections. President of the strongest opposition party in the Serbian and the federal parliaments— the Serbian Radical Party—Vojislav Seselj set out that the Serbian radicals would focus their election campaign on economic and social issues. Seselj accused the regime of having done nothing in the area of the national issue, but of aggravating the situation even further, and the republican government of squandering funds.

Seselj criticized Milosevic for using the state media for the election campaign of his party—the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia—illustrating this with Milosevic's talk with the directors and editors-in-chief of the main news media in Serbia on Wednesday.

Leader of the People's Party, Milan Paroski, said that his party fully accepted Milosevic's initiative at the Wednesday talks that equal conditions must be secured for all parties in the state media.

Paroski, however, criticized Milosevic for not appearing at the talks as the president of the republic but as the person who is to head the list of candidates of the Socialist Party of Serbia.

Kosovo

Serbs Refuse Rugova Passport, French Trip Canceled

AU0411193093 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1830 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] It is reported that Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, president of the republic of Kosova, has been denied a passport by the Serbian authorities. President Rugova had planned to make a three-day visit to France, where he was supposed to meet French Foreign Minister Juppe on Thursday afternoon [4 November], as well as Simone Veil, minister for social affairs.

During his stay in Paris he was also to have meetings at the Ministry of Defense and the National Assembly. However, Rugova cannot travel because he has been denied a passport by the Serbian authorities.